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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Experiencing a traumatic event is not a rare eventuality, estimates of lifetime 
traumatic event prevalence rate range from around 54% (Kessler, Sonnega, Bromet, 
Hughes, & Nelson, 1995; Kilpatrick et al., 2013) to 89% varying by country, historical, 
political and social factors (Atwoli, Stein, Koenen, & McLaughlin, 2015; Burri & 
Maercker, 2014). Moreover, more than 30% of individuals worldwide have a history of 
multiple traumatic experiences (Kessler et al., 2017). Virtually, at least one of two in 
the general population is a traumatized individual. Maladaptive reactions to these 
events can lead to the development of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). PTSD 
patients suffer from the trauma, re-experiencing unwanted details, thoughts and even 
dreaming of it (see chapter 1 below for a full clinical description of the disorder). They 
live in a constant enhanced physiological state, continuously monitoring for possible 
threats in the environment. Moreover, they start avoiding situations or people that 
could remind them of the trauma. Finally, individuals who develop persistent PTSD, 
also experience several emotional responses (such as fear, sadness, guilt) (Ehlers & 
Clark, 2000). Fear and anxiety mechanisms are clearly at the core of this disorder, 
such that it was previously classified as an anxiety disorder. Together with these 
symptoms, there are also several parallel underlying cognitive changes taking place 
that affect the way the world is attended to and could be responsible for the 
development and maintenance of the disorder.  
Worth noting, PTSD is one of the rare circumstances in which the etiological factor, 
which triggered the disorder, is known (Ehlers & Clark, 2000) and consequently 
perceptual and attentional processing of it can more easily be object of investigation, 
together with its sequelae. 
An impairment in autobiographical memory, theorized in several “dual representation” 
models has been established to be at the core of the disorder, with an exacerbation 
in processing and representing traumatic cues accompanied by a poorer integrated 
analysis and representation of the related contexts, or at least of a scarce integrated 
representation of their association. 
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Nevertheless, little is still known regarding how processing of fear or traumatic 
information in the first place affects our memory of it and consequently future 
information processing and behavior. 
The way we encode and represent every experience depends critically on our 
perceptual and attentional processes (Kanwisher & Wojciulik, 2000), and even at 
rest, we constantly monitor our internal and external environment in individually 
different intrinsic ways (Gusnard, Raichle, & Raichle, 2001) and probably process off-
line past events for memory consolidation (Miall & Robertson, 2006). 
It is worth noting that, among exposed individuals only 5.6% develops PTSD (this 
percentage increases depending on gender and sociodemographic characteristics) 
and only half of these develop persistent PTSD (Koenen et al., 2017). This suggests 
that individual differences exist in vulnerability and resilience to traumata and 
increased understanding of these differences with the associated mechanisms is 
clearly an important goal. 
It is thus important to study individual differences in the way we attend the world 
regardless of a specific task and see how these differences are associated with basic 
mechanisms in making fear and anxiety associations. Differentiating predispositions 
at rest can be insightful in understanding proneness to develop these associations in 
a maladaptive way. Further, we tried to connect encoding mechanisms (perceptual 
and attentional processes) of high adaptive value events with memory and learning. 
 
In the present work, we aimed at answering some of these open questions by 
investigating: 
- cued and contextual conditioning mechanisms (subserving fear and anxiety 
learning) in association with neural patterns at rest, using functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) in healthy controls; 
- encoding mechanisms (subserving perceptual and attentional processes) and their 
association with learning and memory through the means of brain event-related 
potentials (ERPs) and eye tracking measures of cues and contexts in PTSD and 
traumatized individuals who did not develop the disorder (NPTSD). 
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1.1 Posttraumatic stress disorder  
After a traumatic experience individuals that develop PTSD experience a number of 
distressing symptoms included in three main categories re-experiencing (intrusive 
memories, thoughts and/or flashbacks), heightened general arousal (hyperattention 
and continuous monitoring for potential threats, enhanced startle reactivity), 
emotional numbing and avoidance regarding reminders of the traumatic event 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2010). In the last update of the DSM (Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders), DSM-5 (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013), PTSD has been moved from the category of anxiety disorders 
into a new one of “trauma and stressor-related disorders”. This related to the fact that 
the presence of a known stressor triggers the development of the disorder. 
Previously described symptoms in DSM-IV were mostly kept and another cluster of 
symptoms regarding negative alterations in cognitions and mood has been added. 
According to the cognitive model of PTSD proposed from Ehlers and Clark (2000), 
there are two main processes at play: individual differences in the appraisal of the 
trauma (including sensory processing) and/or its sequelae and individual differences 
in the memory for the event and its connection to other memories (Ehlers & Clark, 
2000). The authors propose that “the trauma memory is poorly elaborated and 
inadequately integrated into its context in time, place, subsequent and previous 
information and other autobiographical memories”. These differences are responsible 
for creating the perception of a current threat, through “situational fear” and 
avoidance through generalization, even though the traumatic event is in the past. 
As a neurobiological correlate of PTSD impaired prefrontal cortex (PFC) top-down 
modulation of an hyper-responsive amygdala, together with alterations of 
hippocampal function and structure that leads to an impairment in contextual 
processing mechanisms have been proposed (Rauch, Shin, & Phelps, 2006).  
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1.2 Dual representation models of learning and memory 
 
A “dual representation” theory of PTSD has been proposed (Brewin, Dalgleish, & 
Joseph, 1996) and recently updated (Brewin, Gregory, Lipton, & Burgess, 2010) 
according to which, an imbalance or even a dissociation between sensorial and 
contextual representation of the information is responsible for the mnemonic 
sequelae (intrusions, flashbacks etc.) of the disorder. 
The first representation of the information present and processed during the 
traumatic event is made through binding sensorial details (S-rep) with 
emotional/affective states. The second representation is a contextual one (C-rep), a 
spatially less structured and abstract representation of where the event is happening. 
The C-rep, that would be mainly encoded in a viewpoint-independent (allocentric) 
and retrieved in a viewpoint-dependent (egocentric) perspective, is considered to be 
poorly encoded in individuals who develop PTSD or at least poorly associated with 
the related S-reps.  
Other authors, in a similar fashion, presented a model describing the existence of 
unitary and conjunctive representations referring to the main salient events and 
backgrounds/contexts of the encoded scene (Rudy, Huff, & Matus-Amat, 2004; Rudy 
& O'Reilly, 2001). Flor and Wessa (2010) reinterpreted these previous models and in 
line with them theorized that individuals who develop PTSD might have impaired 
contextual processing and others (Acheson, Gresack, & Risbrough, 2012) suggested 
that processing in PTSD might depend mostly on an elemental representation 
strategy probably due to impaired hippocampal processing that weakens the 
conjunctive one. Thus, the properties of these models have also been integrated in a 
mechanistic and neurobiological manner with fear conditioning mechanisms and it 
has been assumed that the amygdala is mainly mediating elemental representations 
and contextual conditioning and the hippocampal formation is mainly mediating 
contextual representations (Acheson et al., 2012; Maren, 2001; Maren, Phan, & 
Liberzon, 2013; Maren & Quirk, 2004).This hippocampal impairment would also 
explain why these patients cannot correctly differentiate dangerous and safe contexts 
(Rudy, 2009). A major function of this circuit is in the disambiguation of cues that 
have different meanings in different contexts (Maren et al., 2013). 
Interestingly, even though these models assume that the development and 
maintenance of PTSD is based on mnemonic and retrieval features of the traumatic 
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event (choosing the hippocampus as a possible main vulnerability factor), they 
mention perceptual and attentional aspects as been relevantly involved but not 
relevantly affected in the disorder. S-rep, unitary and elemental representations are 
individually encoded perceptions in the different sensorial modalities (such as tactile, 
visual, odor, spatial or temporal stimuli) selected as salient (emotionally charged), 
while conjunctive representation would refer to an integrated perception of the 
different elements associated together and with the environment in a more abstract 
unstructured form (Acheson et al., 2012; Rudy et al., 2004). 
More recently it has also been proposed a dissociation between perceptual and 
episodic memory as accounting for flashbacks and intrusions. The contextualization 
processes would be led from selective attention and recoding of the sensory input, 
thus pointing to a more organized and integrated information representation (more 
easily consciously accessible and reducing involuntary intrusions) (Brewin, 2014). 
Despite this, perceptual and attentional processes and the way they could differently 
interact with memory have only partially been taken into account in these models.  
 
 
1.3 Neurocircuitry of stress and anxiety disorders (or trauma related disorders) 
 
Preclinical studies of stress and conditioned fear by researchers such as Davis 
(1992) and LeDoux (2003) informed nowadays neuroimaging investigations in 
humans of what is called “fear network”, a basic model of normal fear responding 
focused on the critical role of the amygdala in fear acquisition and expression. 
Cortical feedback to the amygdala is provided by specific brain regions, including the 
medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), the anterior cingulate; the hippocampus provides 
information about the context of a potentially threatening stimulus or situation, and 
draws on information about the environment retrieved from explicit memory caches 
(Kent & Rauch, 2003). 
Studies in humans quite unanimously confirmed the role of amygdala, hippocampus 
and frontal control regions in the pathophysiology of anxiety and stress/trauma 
related disorders (Sehlmeyer et al., 2009; Shin & Liberzon, 2010). 
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PTSD and other anxiety disorders (e.g. panic disorders, social anxiety disorder) have 
been linked to different pattern of activation but sharing the core of this neurocircuitry, 
amygdala, hippocampus and mPFC (Kent & Rauch, 2003). 
PTSD especially has been associated with atypical connectivity between amygdala 
hippocampus and mPFC (Michopoulos, Norrholm, & Jovanovic, 2015).  
 
1.4 Cued and contextual fear conditioning 
Fear is an adaptive essential emotion in humans and fear learning mechanisms are 
representative of basic learning mechanisms in what concerns making associations 
between internal or external stimuli and/or situations.  
It has been proposed that pathological anxiety could emerge from dysregulated 
patterns of fear learning (Shin & Liberzon, 2010) thus, cued and contextual classical 
conditioning paradigms have been extensively used as experimental models for 
anxiety disorders (Glotzbach-Schoon et al., 2013; Grillon, 2002b; Indovina, Robbins, 
Nunez-Elizalde, Dunn, & Bishop, 2011).  
In classical conditioning, an initially neutral stimulus becomes conditioned (CS) after 
being paired with a biologically relevant stimulus called unconditioned (US) and 
becomes able to elicit a conditioned response (CR) that may be similar but can also 
be antagonistic to the original or unconditioned response (UR).  
In discrimination paradigms, two CSs are used, not only the one paired with the US 
(CS+) but also another one that it is never paired with it (CS−) (Lissek et al., 2005). 
The difference between CRs to the CS+ and CS− will provide a differential index 
indicative of discriminative learning (Lissek et al., 2005). In order to avoid 
sensitization phenomena only a part of the CSs+ is constantly paired with the US. A 
low differential value between CS+ and CS- could then be indicative either of 
enhanced conditionability, to both dangerous and safe signals, or of enhanced 
generalization through an inability of inhibiting fear towards safety cues (Duits et al., 
2015). Either conceptualization (i.e., stimulus generalization or lack to inhibit fear) 
supports impaired discrimination learning. 
The output of the autonomic nervous system associated with fear conditioning can be 
measured through recording of the skin conductance response (SCR) (Marin et al., 
2017; Orr et al., 2000). This peripheral outcome can be also used in differential 
conditioning studies, providing a differential SCR (Michopoulos et al., 2015). 
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Importantly, it has been proposed that different type of conditioning could better 
model different aspects of fear learning and consequently different mental disorders 
(Indovina et al., 2011). Cued conditioning, in which there is learning of an association 
between a discrete stimulus (cue) and a predictable danger (US), might better model 
aspects of phobic fear. In contrast, context conditioning involves the association 
between an internal or external context with an unpredictable danger (aversive event 
delivered with variable onsets) and thus could better model sustained anxiety 
(Grillon, 2002a). Individual differences in healthy individuals affecting these 
mechanisms have been proposed to be also associated with higher risk of 
developing an anxiety disorder (Mineka & Oehlberg, 2008).  
An important further step in understanding the pathophysiology of these disorders 
can be made by understanding neural differences associated with these conditioning 
mechanisms and the activity/connectivity of the brain at rest. 
 
 
1.5 Perceptual and attentional mechanisms in PTSD 
Already back of several decades an information processing model of anxiety was 
proposed (Beck & Clark, 1997) in which the biased perception of a threatening 
stimulus was the core explanation for development and maintenance of anxiety 
disorders “… pathological anxiety… is a biased or overestimated perception of 
danger which does not correspond to the exigencies of the internal or external 
environment… ” (p .51).  
Clinical observations showed that some stimuli can trigger intrusions (Foa, Steketee, 
& Rothbaum, 1989) in PTSD and that these sensations are predominantly visual and 
seem to happen in the ‘here and now’ rather than being memories of past (Ehlers et 
al., 2002). Intrusive re-experiencing in PTSD has been linked to perceptual (priming) 
processing of trauma-related material (Ehlers and Clark (2000)) and recently 
associated with the hypothesized lack of conceptual processing (Lyttle, Dorahy, 
Hanna, & Huntjens, 2010). A study that assessed perceptual bias using a blurred 
picture identification task in a large cohort of trauma survivors concluded that a 
processing bias exists specifically for trauma-related stimuli compared to neutral or 
negative in PTSD and acute stress disorder patients compared to NPTSD (Kleim, 
Ehring, & Ehlers, 2012). The authors refer to it as a processing advantage leading to 
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an enhanced readiness for trauma-related information. A study using fMRI reported 
an atypical visual sensory processing in PTSD in the ventral visual stream, thought to 
be responsible for object property processing during a picture-viewing task (Mueller-
Pfeiffer et al., 2013). The authors linked this deficit to dysfunctional attention 
processes. 
Indeed, the description of PTSD symptoms frequently includes a constant search for 
threat in the everyday environment beyond those related to the original trauma, 
suggesting that PTSD patients might be generally oversensitive to threat (Zukerman, 
Itzchak, Fostick, & Armony-Sivan, 2017); this comes together with extreme 
avoidance of possible trauma reminder exposure. Hyperarousal (hyper-sensitivity) 
and avoidance symptoms, core features of PTSD and of anxiety disorders in general, 
are thought to work through associated atypical attentional (covert or overt) 
processes (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 
2007). Thus, vigilance-avoidance models of anxiety have been proposed prompted 
from the work of Williams, Watts, MacLeod and Matthews (1988). These models 
have been tested and challenged especially in studies employing eye tracking 
methodologies because eye tracking can provide a more direct measure of 
attentional bias without requiring verbal or motor responses (Felmingham, Rennie, 
Manor, & Bryant, 2011). Eye tracking associated with free viewing paradigms can 
therefore delineate different mechanisms of attention bias and its effects 
(hypervigilance, maintenance/disengagement and attentional avoidance) with 
minimal interference. 
As reported in a recent meta-analysis (Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012), the most 
frequently observed effect in eye tracking free viewing studies of anxiety disorders is 
hypervigilance, with sooner fixation towards threat in anxious versus non-anxious 
individuals and towards threatening stimuli, instead of positive. In contrast, this 
spatial orienting bias has not been consistently reported regarding maintenance or 
avoidance of aspects of attention. 
Findings regarding PTSD point in the same direction. One study showed a 
significantly higher number of initial fixations to trauma-related words in the PTSD 
group compared to traumatized (NPTSD) controls. Another study found differences in 
in a sample of individuals with anxiety disorder in a dimensional fashion; individuals 
with high compared to low number of PTSD symptoms had larger pupillary dilatation 
and fixation time (Kimble, Fleming, Bandy, Kim, & Zambetti, 2010). 
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Importantly, it has been explicitly stated that the usage of threatening cues 
embedded in naturalistic scenes would be an advantage in attentional eye tracking 
studies (Williams et al., 1988) because it would provide alternative of locations to be 
fixated apart from threat in a more ecological way. 
 
 
1.6 Neurobiological and neurophysiological correlates of relevant mechanisms for 
PTSD 
1.6.1 Resting-state fMRI 
Resting state (rs) fMRI measures spontaneous and synchronous low frequency 
fluctuations (<0.1 Hz) in the blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) signal to 
investigate the functional connectivity of the brain. “Resting state” refers to the initially 
surprising finding that the brain is very active even while not involved in any specific 
task (Raichle & Mintun, 2006) and “connectivity” refers to the fact that regions of the 
brain spatially distinct can be temporally correlated. 
Since Biswal, Yetkin, Haughton, and Hyde (1995) discovery of a resting state signal 
in the brain and Raichle et al. (2001) publication of a “default mode brain function” 
while spontaneously and constantly monitoring external and internal stimuli, much 
work has been published to document the relevance of resting-state functional 
connectivity (rs-FC) in basic and clinical neuroscience (Lee, Smyser, & Shimony, 
2013). 
It has been proposed that connectivity in rs networks is associated with activity and 
performance during tasks through specific cognitive mechanisms (Madhyastha, 
Askren, Boord, & Grabowski, 2015; Mennes et al., 2010; Schultz, Balderston, & 
Helmstetter, 2012). 
This concept has also been extended to anxiety disorders and it has been proposed 
that investigating changes in specific networks at rest relates to general cognitive 
functioning and can highlight modulation of fear responses (Schultz et al., 2012; 
Sylvester et al., 2012). In this direction, some studies showed that rs-FC of the 
amygdala (with mPFC and ACC) was altered following a cue conditioning paradigm 
(Schultz et al., 2012) and after fear reminder exposure (P. Feng, Zheng, & Feng, 
2016). Enhanced rs-FC connectivity between the amygdala and a region in the right 
anterolateral temporal cortex in patients with vmPFC lesions was found and 
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interpreted as relevant for psychopathology, connecting a loss or reduction of 
functionality of the first with more activity in the second (Motzkin et al., 2015). 
Especially, the default mode network (DMN) is thought to support a state of 
readiness in responding to environmental demands (Kluetsch et al., 2012) and was 
specifically shown to be relevant for affective and cue safety learning (Fullana et al., 
2016). A study reported that the DMN was anti-correlated with a fear-processing 
network and was described as active when feeling safe and thus necessary for 
conceptualizing safe memories (Marstaller, Williams, Rich, Savage, & Burianova, 
2015). None of these studies, however, differentiated the contribution of contextual 
and cued learning mechanisms with respect to relevant resting state networks and 
their implications for anxiety disorders. 
 
 
 
1.6.2 Electroencephalographic (EEG) and event-related perceptual studies in 
anxiety and/or trauma related disorders 
EEG is, due its accurate temporal resolution in the order of milliseconds (ms) and low 
number of exclusion criteria, an elective method for studying information processing 
abnormalities in clinical populations. 
Several electroencephalographic (EEG) studies of event-related potentials (ERPs) 
have investigated differences in information processing between individuals 
diagnosed with PTSD, traumatized individuals that did not develop the disorder and 
healthy controls and showed relevant abnormalities in the amplitudes and latencies 
of several components (from 50 (mainly auditory) to 300 ms) (for a review, 
Javanbakht, Liberzon, Amirsadri, Gjini, & Boutros, 2011). 
Despite this, trauma-related changes in PTSD have been mostly investigated in 
amplitudes and latencies of the attention related P300 component (with onset around 
250-300 ms after stimulus presentation) (Johnson, Allana, Medlin, Harris, & Karl, 
2013). 
In this regard, it is worth mentioning the recent interest in assessing early perceptual 
top-down modulation from higher order cognitive areas to primary visual areas 
through changes in amplitudes, latencies and polarity of the component C1 in visual 
tasks. The C1 is the earliest described visual deflection in the ERP and mainly 
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generated from activity in the primary visual cortex (V1) (Clark, Fan, & Hillyard, 
1994). It shows a characteristic change in polarity in response to stimuli presented in 
the upper or lower visual field (due to the retinotopic organization of V1) (Bayer et al., 
2017; Clark et al., 1994; Jeffreys & Axford, 1972).  
Several studies showed different processes affecting this component, such as spatial 
attention (Kelly, Gomez-Ramirez, & Foxe, 2008; Proverbio & Adorni, 2009), aversive 
learning (Pourtois, Grandjean, Sander, & Vuilleumier, 2004; Stolarova, Keil, & 
Moratti, 2006), anxiety (Rossi & Pourtois, 2017), mood state and emotional 
processing (Brosch, Sander, Pourtois, & Scherer, 2008; Vanlessen, Rossi, De Raedt, 
& Pourtois, 2014) and emotionally complex and competing stimuli in the same visual 
field (West, Anderson, Ferber, & Pratt, 2011). 
Other ERP, EEG and magnetoencephalographic (MEG) studies that focused on the 
emotional modulation of C1 in high and lower level of anxiety, or of fearful ecological 
stimuli reported that the onset of this component is in such cases shifted even earlier, 
possibly due to the adaptive significance of these stimuli (West et al., 2011; Weymar, 
Keil, & Hamm, 2014). 
These findings suggest that plasticity of the visual cortex and its neural connectivity 
act to optimize early perception of specific features indicative of emotional relevance 
(Stolarova et al., 2006) and make it an interesting target in PTSD patients 
considering their hypersensitivity to threat. 
 
1.7 Hypotheses 
This dissertation aimed at investigating the role of cued and contextual fear- and 
anxiety-related mechanisms (underlying maladaptive learning in the development 
and maintenance of anxiety disorders) in association with resting state connectivity in 
healthy individuals and encoding mechanisms at play in PTSD versus NPTSD 
groups. 
 
Specifically, in the first study we tested the association between DMN connectivity 
and learning physiological indicators of cue and context conditioning paradigms 
(recording differential skin conductance responses (SCR)). We also investigated the 
role of trait anxiety though mean of linear regressions. Individual differences in neural 
networks associated with these mechanisms already at rest can elucidate 
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vulnerability in the same mechanisms involved in the development of an anxiety 
disorder. 
 
We expected healthy individuals to show a different predisposition in their brain 
activity at rest depending on their conditionability and trait anxiety scores. Because of 
the reported neurocircuitry in anxiety disorders and conditioning and the role of the 
DMN, we expected: 
- individuals with high differential SCR during cue conditioning to show a 
reduced connectivity within the DMN involving the amygdala and mPFC; 
- individuals with high differential SCR during context conditioning to show a 
reduced connectivity within the DMN involving the hippocampus. 
 
In the second study we examined the information processing patterns of cue and 
contextual features in both traumatized individuals that developed PTSD compared to 
those who did not develop the disorder (NPTSD). We used high-density EEG 
recordings with simultaneous eye tracking during free viewing of trauma-related cues 
embedded in naturalistic contexts. On the following day we tested retrieval and 
memory manipulating cue and context associations. 
We expected PTSD patients to show an early encoding bias with respect to NPSD: 
- at the perceptual level in the polarity/amplitude of the earliest visual 
component (C1), processing of the traumatic parts of the pictures (lower visual 
field) in PTSD would lead to a less negative C1 (ideally a polarity inversion) as 
indicator of which part of the visual field is processed; 
- in the behavioral/attentional profile through the indices of eye tracking, we 
expected faster attending to traumatic cues than contexts; 
- finally, this atypical encoding should account for variance in the memory 
impairment, with shorter attending and processing time of the contexts 
predicting a worse conjunctive representation of the tested material. 
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2 EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
2.1 Study 1: Default mode network connectivity of fear- and anxiety-related cue and 
context conditioning.1 
  
                                            
1
 Publication: Zidda, F., Andoh, J., Pohlack, S., Winkelmann, T., Dinu-Biringer, R., Cavalli, J., Ruttorf, 
M., Nees, F., Flor, H. (2016).  Default mode network connectivity of fear- and anxiety-related cue and 
context conditioning. NeuroImage. 165, 190-199.  
Doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2017.10.024. 
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Abstract 
 
Classical fear conditioning is an important mechanism to adequately respond and 
adapt to environmental threats and has been related to the development of fear and 
anxiety. Both cue and context conditioning have been studied but little is known 
about their relation to relevant resting state networks. The default mode network 
(DMN) has been reported to be involved in affective learning and described as 
facilitating a state of readiness in responding to environmental changes.  
We examined resting state brain connectivity patterns of the default mode network 
(DMN) in 119 healthy volunteers. Specifically, we carried out correlation analyses 
between the DMN and skin conductance responses (SCRs) as well as arousal, 
valence and contingency ratings during learning. In addition, we examined the role of 
trait anxiety. Two different DMN patterns were identified in which stronger 
connectivity was linked to lower differential SCRs during fear and anxiety learning. 
One was related to cue conditioning and involved the amygdala and the medial 
prefrontal cortex, and one was associated with context conditioning and included the 
hippocampal formation and sensorimotor areas. These results were replicated in an 
independent sample. Functional connectivity of the DMN with these key regions at 
rest was also predictive of trait anxiety but this association could not be replicated in 
the second sample. 
We showed that DMN connectivity is differently associated with cued versus 
contextual learning mechanisms. Uncovering individual differences in baseline 
network connectivity of the DMN with these key regions might lead to a better 
understanding of fear and anxiety. Such findings could indeed help to identify 
vulnerability factors linked to network alterations at rest with dysregulation of learning 
processes involved in the pathophysiology of stress and anxiety disorders.  
 
Keywords: 
Highlights 
• Default mode network (DMN) connectivity linked to fear and anxiety learning  
• DMN functional connectivity (FC) with amygdala relates to cue conditioning 
• FC between DMN and hippocampus associates with context conditioning 
• FC in amygdala and hippocampus with DMN is predictive of trait anxiety 
• Important implications for mechanisms involved in stress and anxiety disorders 
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Introduction 
 
Cued and contextual conditioning paradigms have been used as experimental 
models for anxiety disorders (Glotzbach-Schoon et al.,2013; Grillon, 2002b; Indovina 
et al., 2011). Aversive classical conditioning is a well-established laboratory 
procedure in which emotionally neutral stimuli that occur in connection with harmful 
or otherwise aversive events acquire the capacity to elicit defensive responses 
(Fanselow and LeDoux, 1999). In particular, cued conditioning might model aspects 
of phobic fear because it involves the learning of an association between a discrete 
stimulus (cue) and a highly predictable danger (the aversive event or unconditioned 
stimulus (US)). In contrast, context conditioning involves the association between a 
diffuse and not easily discriminable surrounding, an internal or external context, with 
an unpredictable danger (aversive event delivered with variable onsets) and has thus 
been related to sustained anxiety (Grillon, 2002a). The neural correlates of fear 
learning have been well established with a pivotal role of the amygdala and the insula 
in the acquisition and expression of conditioned fear as well as the modulatory role of 
the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) 
on these limbic regions (Kumar et al., 2013; Sehlmeyer et al., 2009; Shankman et al., 
2014; Shin and Liberzon, 2010). In addition, the hippocampal formation has been 
established as a core region in contextual conditioning (Acheson et al., 2012; Rudy, 
2009; Rudy et al., 2002). Dissociable roles for hippocampus and amygdala were also 
described in structural magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) studies. Increased 
amygdalar volume in particular was associated with higher skin conductance 
responses (SCRs) during cued fear acquisition (Cacciaglia et al., 2015; Winkelmann 
et al., 2016) and increased hippocampal volume was linked to a greater ability in 
discriminating contexts and context conditioning (Pohlack et al., 2012a).  
However, it still remains unclear how and if individual differences of regional brain 
activation of these key regions at rest and in a network perspective are associated 
with learning performance and if they may act through these aversive learning 
mechanisms to confer vulnerability to anxiety- and stress-related disorders. A 
previous study showed that resting state functional connectivity (rs-FC) of the 
amygdala (with mPFC and ACC) was altered in a cue conditioning paradigm (Schultz 
et al., 2012). The authors found an increased connectivity between the superior 
frontal gyrus and the amygdala following conditioning, possibly as a consequence of 
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the memory strength of newly acquired material. Recently, resting state connectivity 
between the amygdala and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), after fear 
reminder exposure, was suggested to be a predictor of the subsequent extinction 
effect (Feng et al., 2016). Motzkin et al. showed enhanced rs-FC connectivity 
between the amygdala and a region in the right anterolateral temporal cortex in 
patients with vmPFC lesions. The authors interpreted this finding as directly relevant 
for psychopathology, delineating a detailed relationship between mPFC and 
amygdala, loss or reduction of functionality of the first would result in more activity in 
the second (Motzkin et al., 2015). Recently, the default mode network (DMN) was 
shown to be relevant for affective and cue safety learning (Fullana et al., 2016). The 
DMN participates in internal modes of cognition (Buckner et al., 2008), is thought to 
facilitate a state of readiness in responding to environmental changes (Kluetsch et 
al., 2012) and has also been linked to certain aspects of social cognition (Mars et al., 
2012). Marstaller et al. (2017) described the DMN as necessary for conceptualizing 
safe memories and interpreted it as a mind-wandering state possible when 
individuals consider themselves to be safe (Marstaller et al., 2017). The authors 
reported that the DMN was anti-correlated with a fear-processing network. These 
studies, however, all used discrete cues and/or predictive stimuli in their experimental 
paradigms but so far contextual and cued learning mechanisms have not been 
differentiated with respect to relevant resting state networks. It is still unclear if 
changes in the functional connectivity of the DMN are differently related to fear and 
anxiety learning and how this relates to trait anxiety measures.  
In the present study we tested the link between rs-FC in the DMN and cue as well as 
context conditioning as important mechanisms of fear- and anxiety-related 
processes. We combined rs-fMRI assessments with two subsequent conditioning 
sessions, using differential skin conductance scores of cue and context conditioning 
as indices of different types of associative learning.  
Our hypotheses state that increased functional connectivity of the DMN (1) with the 
amygdala and frontal control regions would be associated with a decrease in the 
magnitude of cue aversive learning, and (2) that another DMN connectivity pattern 
including the hippocampal formation, would negatively correlate with the strength of 
contextual conditioning indices. 
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Materials and methods 
 
Participants 
One-hundred-twenty-two healthy adults (35 females; mean age 21.77, s.d. 2.95, 
range 18–39 years) participated in the study. They were recruited in schools for 
rescue workers in the context of a longitudinal study on predictors of posttraumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD). The sample overlaps with that of previous studies (Pohlack 
et al., 2012b, 2015; Winkelmann et al., 2016). Exclusion criteria included mental 
disorders such as major depressive disorder, current or chronic substance abuse, 
schizophrenia or any personality disorder, as assessed with the Structured Clinical 
Interview for the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-IV (Wittchen 
et al., 1997). The trait scale of the German version of the State-Trait-Anxiety 
Inventory (STAI) (Laux et al., 1981) was also administered (STAI scores, mean 34.77 
s.d. 8,22, range 23–56). Three persons had to be excluded from data analysis due to 
technical issues during the acquisition of rs-fMRI data, leading to 119 participants. 
The Ethical Review Board of the Medical Faculty Mannheim, Heidelberg University, 
approved the study and written informed consent was obtained from all participants. 
 
Experimental design  
The participants were instructed to rest quietly without sleeping during a resting state 
fMRI measurement for 5.32 min (for details on the acquisition parameters see section 
below). Subsequently, SCR measurements were carried out during cue and context 
differential aversive conditioning paradigms. The order of presentation for cue and 
context conditioning was counterbalanced across subjects. We used a well-
established fear conditioning procedures consisting of four phases - habituation, 
early and late acquisition (i.e. ACQ1-2), and extinction - for both cue and context 
conditioning (Cacciaglia et al., 2014; Lang et al., 2009; Pohlack et al., 2015) (see Fig. 
1A and B). A painful electric stimulus on the right thumb of each participant using a 
cupric electrode connected to an electric device (Digitimer, DS7A, Welwyn 
GardenCity, UK) served as unconditioned stimulus (US). Intensities of stimulation 
were determined for each participant using an individually pre-determined threshold 
as follows: increasingly intense stimuli were administered (50-ms bursts, 12 Hz) 
starting with a mild stimulus until each participant indicated it as “painful” (pain 
threshold) and then further until the pain became unbearable (pain tolerance). This 
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procedure was repeated three times, and the values of the last two trials were 
averaged. The chosen stimulus intensity was defined at 80% between pain threshold 
and pain tolerance such that the sensation was painful but tolerable. The participants 
were then asked to rate the intensity and unpleasantness of the US on two Likert 
scales ranging from 0 (not painful or unpleasant) to 10 (extremely painful or 
unpleasant). The stimuli had to be rated at least as seven on both scales to be 
administered during the experimental session and if not the intensity was increased 
until this level was reached. 
For cue conditioning, two geometric figures (a blue square and a yellow rhombus) 
served as conditioned stimulus (CS). During habituation, 10 CS followed by the US 
(CS+) and 10 CS never followed by the US (CS–) were presented for 6 s; 4 US were 
presented for 2.9 s in random order. The acquisition and extinction phases comprised 
18 presentations of each CS-type (CS+ (CS paired with the US) and CS- (never 
paired with the US)). During acquisition, the CS+ was coupled with the US in 50% of 
the cases (called CS + paired) (starting 3.1 s after cue onset and terminating with the 
CS) in the other 50% the CS+ was presented without the US (called CS + unpaired) 
(Fig. 1A).  
In the context condition, we used two colors, which were filling the entire visual field. 
To give the participants a stronger feeling of context, both CSs were blended into 
each other and were reaching the full color spectrum only after a fading phase (see 
Fig. 1B). This temporal component is considered an essential part of conceptualizing 
a context because it allows the viewer, even while using a simple color, to experience 
a complete meaningful percept (Maren et al., 2013). In the habituation phase, the US 
(2.9 s) was delivered 10 times during the interstimulus interval (4–12 s); in early and 
late acquisition, the US was paired to 50% of the CS+. To enhance unpredictability 
the onset of the US was randomly assigned over the time course of the CS+ (3–8 s 
after CS+ onset) (Grillon et al., 2006; Pohlack et al., 2015). The CS- was never 
accompanied by the US (safe condition), neither in cue nor in context conditioning. 
During extinction, no US was presented. 
 
Skin conductance response (SCR) 
 
During each conditioning phase, we recorded SCRs using a BrainAmp ExG MR 
device in combination with a GSR MR module (Brain Products, Gilching, Germany) at 
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a sampling rate of 16 Hz. A constant current of 0.5 V passed through 13 mm Ag/AgCl 
electrodes placed on the thenar and hypothenar eminence of the participants’ left 
hand. An electrolyte gel consisting of 0.5% saline in a neutral base (Brain Products, 
Gilching, Germany) was placed in each electrode cup prior to electrode attachment. 
The recording procedure followed previously published guidelines (Boucsein et al., 
2012). 
 
 
Fig. 1. Aversive conditioning paradigms: (A) Cued conditioning paradigm consisting of habituation, early (ACQ1) and late 
acquisition (ACQ2), and extinction phases. CS±: conditioned stimulus; US: unconditioned stimulus. Two different colors (yellow 
and blue) served as CS±. (B) Context conditioning paradigm. Two different colors (orange and lilac) served as CS±. Contexts 
were blended into each other before they reach their maximum spectrum. CS ± presentation varied between 3 and 12 s. US 
onset was unpredictable, i.e. varied between 3 and 8 s after full spectrum was reached and lasted 2.9 s. During habituation and 
extinction phases, the two colors were always separated by a black screen. 
 
 
Skin conductance responses (SCRs) were analyzed using the Ledalab software 
(Benedek and Kaernbach, 2010) and were defined as the maximum response 
amplitude between 1 and 9 s after CS onset with a criterion of the smallest 
recordable SCR set at 0.01 μS. For each individual, the amplitudes of the SCRs were 
averaged across trials. SCR values were normalized using a logarithmic 
transformation [ln (1 + SCR)]. For each subject, differential SCRs were obtained by 
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subtracting the SCRs elicited by the CS- from those triggered by the CS þ unpaired 
(CS + unpaired/CS-). Participants whose data were not usable due to artefacts were 
excluded (N = 41 in cue and N = 36 in context). Additionally, non-responders (14 in 
cue and 34 in context) in the SCR differential measures were also excluded in the 
correlation analyses still leading to a substantial subsample of 64 participants in cue 
and 49 in context.  
 
Ratings of arousal, valence and contingency  
After each of the four phases, self-reports (valence and arousal) based on the Self-
Assessment Manikin (Bradley and Lang, 1994) were collected for both CSs and 
converted to a nine-point scale. US expectancy was rated on a visual analogue scale 
of 100 mm length converted to a range from 1 (very unlikely) to 9 (very likely).  
 
Acquisition of MRI data 
A high-resolution T1-weighted 3D image was acquired for each participant on a 3T 
MAGNETOM Trio whole body scanner (Siemens Medical Solutions Healthineers, 
Erlangen, Germany) with a 12-channel head coil using a magnetization prepared 
rapid gradient echo sequence (1 mm isotropic voxel size, TR/TE = 2300/2.98 ms, 
160 slices, matrix = 256 X 256). Resting-state fMRI data were acquired using a T2*-
weighted gradient-echo echo planar imaging sequence with the following 
parameters: 2.3 mm isotropic voxel size, 40 slices; FOV 220 mm; TR/TE = 2700/ 27 
ms, lasting 5.32 min resulting in 120 acquired volumes. 
 
Data analysis 
 
SCRs analysis 
To assess differences in the reaction to CS + unpaired/CS,  
Bonferroni-corrected paired t-tests were employed for each conditioning phase. For 
all statistical analyses we used the Predictive Analytic Software (PASW, SPSS Inc., 
Chicago, IL) for windows, version 20.0.0 and Psych: R package version 3.2.0. 
 
Analysis of functional MRI data 
Whole brain analyses. Resting-state fMRI data were analyzed using Multivariate 
Exploratory Linear Optimized Decomposition into Independent Components 
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(MELODIC) independent components analysis (ICA) from the FSL software package 
(Beckmann et al., 2005, 2009; Beckmann and Smith, 2004). The preprocessing of 
fMRI data included motion correction, high-pass temporal filtering (with a cut-off of 
100 s) and removal of non-brain structures from the echo planar imaging volumes 
using Brain Extraction Tool (http://fsl.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl/fslwiki/BET). The images were 
subsequently smoothed with a Gaussian kernel of full-width at half-maximum of 5 
mm. fMRI volumes were registered to the individual's structural scan and to MNI-152 
standard space images using FMRIB's Linear Image Registration Tool 
(http://fsl.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl/fslwiki/FLIRT). MELODIC ICA was applied using all fMRI 
scans together (n= 119) to obtain robust group-ICA spatial maps. Correlation 
analyses were carried out between the independent component maps relevant to our 
hypotheses (i.e. DMN) and the average differential SCRs (CS+ unpaired/CS-), 
acquired during the conditioning experiment, using dual regression and 1000 
permutations in randomize (FMRIB Software Library randomise v2.9) with threshold-
free cluster enhancement (TFCE) and family-wise error correction (FWE) (p < 0.05) 
(Nichols and Holmes, 2002). Uncorrected exploratory thresholds (puncorrected < 
0.005) were employed when appropriate based on a priori hypotheses and reported.  
 
Region of interest analyses (ROIs). In order to test specifically the differential role of 
amygdala and hippocampus within the DMN, we additionally extracted the mean 
signal values representing functional connectivity coefficients from selected ROIs: 1) 
left and right hippocampus, dentate gyrus/cornu ammonis and subiculum; 2) left and 
right amygdala, centromedial and basolateral group, through the means of the Jülich 
histological atlas masks (Amunts et al., 2005; Eickhoff et al., 2005). The FC 
coefficients of the selected ROIs were then used to conduct linear regression 
analyses with trait anxiety. Before running the linear regression test, we assessed the 
linearity assumption plotting scatterplots of the mean extracted signal values in these 
ROIs against the sum of the STAI scores (normalized, using a natural logarithmic 
transformation) with a superimposed regression line. Visual inspection of these two 
plots indicated a linear relationship between the variables. There was 
homoscedasticity and normality of the residuals. 
 
Direct comparison of correlation coefficients of amygdalar and hippocampal ROIs 
with conditioning scores. In order to directly test how within subject differences in the 
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conditioning indicators were associated specifically with hippocampus and amygdala 
in the same participant, we conducted additional analyses computing a direct 
comparison of these correlation coefficients within the same person. For this purpose 
we employed Pearson correlations to examine whether the degree of functional 
connectivity of the amygdala and the hippocampus with the DMN correlated 
differently with differential SCRs in cue and context conditioning, using a subset of 32 
subjects, consisting of participants who successfully underwent both conditioning 
experiments and showed significant conditioned responses in both designs. This was 
done, taking also into account the dependence due to repeated measures on the 
same sample (t-test on correlated correlation coefficients), in order to draw direct 
statistical comparisons between the degree of rs-FC in certain nodes of the networks 
associated with cue and context conditions. 
 
Replication of results in an independent sample 
 
To avoid any bias due to sample selection (fire workers are suggested to be more 
resilient than the general population (Wagner et al., 1998)), we repeated our ROI 
analyses in a representative healthy population sample, which was matched for age, 
gender and geographical location. Forty-two healthy adults (14 females; mean age 
22.93, s.d. 2.93, range 19–29 years) who met the same in- and exclusion criteria 
were recruited and participated in the same procedures described for the main 
sample. From this sample, we excluded SCR non-responders or participants whose 
data were not usable due to SCR artefacts (N = 12 in cue and N = 10 in context) from 
the correlation analyses that involved SCRs. This still resulted in a sample of N= 30 
participants for cue and N= 32 for context conditioning. To extract coefficients within 
the DMN, and run correlations between connectivity coefficients in these regions and 
differential SCRs in cue and context conditioning, we used the same functional ROIs 
mentioned above (bilateral amygdala and hippocampus). Additionally, we computed 
a linear regression analysis with trait anxiety (STAI scores, mean 34.87, s.d. 7.29, 
range 24–55) as already described above. 
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Results 
 
SCR and self-report data 
 
Successful fear conditioning was shown by both SCRs and self-reports as shown 
here below.  
 
Cue conditioning 
In the habituation phase, no significant SCR differences were found between CS+ 
unpaired and CS-. Arousal was not significantly different between the two CSs, while 
the valence of the CS- was significantly higher than that of the CS+ (resp. t116 = - 
3.05; p = 0.003) and contingency (t116 = -3.2; p = 0.001). During both early and late 
acquisition differences between CS + unpaired and CS- were found to be statistically 
significant (ACQ1: t63 = 8.36; p < 0.001; ACQ2: t63 = 4.99; p < 0.001) for SCR. The 
same applied to the self-report data, such that compared with CS-, the CS+ was 
rated significantly more arousing (ACQ1: t117 = 13.02; p < 0.001; ACQ2: t114 = 
16.18; p < 0.001), more charged on emotional valence (ACQ1: t117 = 15.58; p < 
0.0001; ACQ2: t114 = - 16.94; p < 0.0001) and more likely associated (contingency) 
to the US (ACQ1: t117 = 23.34; p < 0.0001; ACQ2 = t114 = 34.95; p < 0.0001). 
During the extinction phase, no significant differences were found. 
 
Context conditioning 
In the habituation phase, no significant differences between CS+/CS in the SCRs 
were found neither in arousal nor in valence measures but a significant difference 
was found in contingency (t114 = 2.87; p < 0.005) with the mean of the CS+ higher 
than the CS-. During both early and late acquisition, CS+ unpaired was significantly 
higher than CS- (resp. t48 = 5.90; p < 0.0001; t47 = 2.74; p = 0.009). In line with 
these results, arousal (ACQ1: t115 = 10.25; p < 0.0001; ACQ2 = t115 = 11.09; p < 
0.0001), valence (ACQ1 = t115 = 4.68; p < 0.0001; ACQ2 = t115 = 5.08; p < 0.001) 
and contingency (ACQ1: t115 = 23.05; p < 0.0001; ACQ2: t115 = 31.79; p < 0.0001) 
were significantly higher for the CS + than for the CS-. During extinction, differences 
between CS+ and CS- in the SCRs were not statistically different, but reached 
significance in all three self-report measures (arousal: t115 = 4.91; p < 0.0001; 
valence: t115 = 2.15; p = 0.03; contingency: t115 = 4.77; p < 0.0001).  
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MRI data 
 
Identification of the DMN 
Melodic estimated 25 independent components using a Laplacian approximation 
(http://fsl.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl). Three IC maps identified as artefacts were excluded as 
voxels with high values within these ICs were mainly located in the cerebral spinal 
fluid, white matter or large vessels, leaving a total of 22 components. We identified 10 
IC maps which were covering most of the explained variance and which largely 
conformed to expected networks identified in other studies: visual network, auditory 
network, DMN (Fig. 2), extrastriate/visual cortex, executive control network, right and 
left lateralized fronto-parietal networks, somatosensory network (Beckmann et al., 
2005; Cole et al., 2010; Damoiseaux et al., 2006; Smith et al., 2013). 
 
Whole brain correlations with SCRs and ratings 
Cue conditioning. For cue conditioning, we found a negative correlation between the 
DMN (e.g. amygdala, mPFC, occipital cortex) and differential SCR values in ACQ1 
(puncorrected< 0.005) (Fig. 3A; Table 1). Correlation analyses carried out between 
rs-IC maps and differential contingency ratings (obtained during ACQ1) revealed a 
significant negative correlation with the DMN, including PCC and precuneus (p < 0.05 
corrected) (see Supplement, Fig. 1). Such correlations were not found for habituation, 
ACQ2 or the extinction phase.  
 
Context conditioning. For context conditioning, we found a significant negative 
correlation between the DMN (bilateral hippocampi, occipital and somatosensory and 
motor cortices) and differential SCR values (p < 0.05 corrected) (Fig. 3B; Table 2), in 
ACQ1. In addition, we observed a significant negative correlation between the DMN 
(including the thalamus) and differential arousal values in extinction (p < 0.05 
corrected). 
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Fig. 2. Independent component (IC) maps representing the default mode network (DMN) detected by group-independent 
component analysis (ICA) in Melodic (FSL) (119 subjects). Statistical images are z values overlaid on a MNI152 brain template. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Results from dual regression analysis (whole brain correlation with differential SCRs): (A) Negative correlations between 
the amygdala and the frontal cortex (within the DMN) with differential SCRs in cue conditioning: p-values uncorrected< 0.005, 
slices are shown at [x = -18, y = -6, z = -16; MNI152 coordinates]). (B) Negative correlations between the hippocampus, 
precuneus, visual and somatosensory cortices (within the DMN) and differential skin conductance responses (SCRs) in context 
conditioning (p-values corrected< 0.05; [x = -22, y = -38, z = -8]). Color bars represent signal intensity (one–P-value). 
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Table 1. Peak voxels (MNI coordinates), t-values and cluster size of brain areas (part of the DMN), which significantly correlated 
with differential skin conductance responses (SCRs) during the cue conditioning phase.  
 
Brain areas (CUE) X 
(mm) 
Y 
(mm) 
Z 
(mm) 
t-
values 
Cluster size 
(voxels) 
Left Amygdala 
Right Amygdala 
-18 
18 
-6 
-2 
-16 
-16 
1.98 
3.36 
2192 
Right Frontal pole, inc.  
 superior frontal 
gyrus 
Left Frontal pole, inc.  
 superior frontal 
gyrus 
30 
6 
-38 
-10 
38 
22 
46 
30 
-16 
52 
-16 
60 
3.40 
3.73 
4.82 
3.50 
1640 
 
 
Right Visual cortex  
Left Visual cortex 
22 
-10 
-74 
-74 
8 
8 
3.13 
3.51 
1394 
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Table 2. Peak voxels (MNI coordinates), t-values and cluster size of brain areas (part of the DMN), which significantly correlated 
with differential skin conductance responses (SCRs) during context conditioning phase.  
 
Brain areas (CONTEXT) X 
(mm) 
Y 
(mm) 
Z 
(mm) 
t-
values 
Cluster size 
(voxels) 
Right hemisphere 
Primary somatosensory 
cortex inc. 
 superior parietal 
lobule 
Primary motor cortex 
Left hemisphere 
Primary somatosensory 
cortex inc. 
 superior parietal 
lobule 
Primary motor cortex 
 
58 
2 
2 
 
-42 
-2 
-2 
 
-14 
-38 
-34 
 
-22 
-38 
-34 
 
40 
60 
68 
 
52 
60 
68 
 
2.73 
4.36 
4.64 
 
3.36 
3.96 
4.64 
 
4876 
Visual cortex (Left 
hemisphere) 
-14 -86 -16 4.51 2765 
Right Hippocampus 
Left Hippocampus 
22 
-18 
-34 
-38 
-8 
-8 
3.30 
4.69 
2395 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Direct comparison of the correlation coefficients of amygdala ROI and hippocampus 
ROI with cue and context SCRs. A comparison of correlation coefficients in the 
amygdala in cue vs. context conditioning did not reach significance (t (31) = 0.53). 
However, the correlation between the functional connectivity coefficient in the 
hippocampus and differential SCRs was significantly stronger in context vs. cue (t 
(31) = - 2.45, p < 0.02) conditioning.  
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Linear regression between functional regions of interest (ROIs) and trait anxiety 
A linear regression established that the FC coefficients in the right amygdala 
(centromedial and basolateral group) were significantly associated with trait anxiety, 
(β= - 0.322; F (1, 100) = 11.55, p < 0.001; 95% confidence interval = from - 0.42 to - 
0.11; Fig. 4A), accounting for 10.4% of the explained variability in trait anxiety scores 
(adjusted R2 = 9.5%; d = - 0.392, medium to large size effect according to Cohen 
(1992)). For the right hippocampus (dentate gyrus/cornus ammonis), there was a 
statistically significant association with trait anxiety, (β= - 0.215; F (1, 100) = 4.83, p < 
0.05; 95% confidence interval = from - 0.34 to - 0.018; Fig. 4B), accounting for 4.6% 
of the variation in anxiety sensitivity scores (adjusted R2 = 3.7%; d = - 0.273, small to 
medium size effect). 
 
Replication of results in an independent sample 
The DMN map (Fig. 5), was identified as one of the first 10 independent components 
(out of 25) which were covering most of the explained variance and which largely 
conformed to expected networks identified in other studies (Beckmann et al., 2005; 
Smith et al., 2013). We found a significant negative correlation, within the DMN, for 
the left and right amygdala and differential SCRs during cue conditioning in ACQ1 
(resp: r - 0.42, p = 0.02; 95% confidence interval = from - 0.68 to - 0.07; r= - 0.49, p = 
0.006; 95% confidence interval = from - 0.72 to - 0.15) (Fig. 6A; Table 3). We also 
found significant negative correlation, within the DMN, with the right hippocampus 
and differential SCRs during context conditioning in ACQ1 (r = - 0.37, p = 0.03; 95% 
confidence interval = from - 0.64 to -0.01) (Fig. 6B; Table 4). A linear regression 
established that the FC coefficients in the left hippocampus (dentate gyrus/cornus 
ammonis), were significantly associated with trait anxiety, (β = 0.42; F (1, 32) = 8.46, 
p = 0.006; 95% confidence interval = from 0.25 to 1.38), accounting for 17.5% of the 
explained variability in trait anxiety scores (adjusted R2 = 14.5%; d = 0.482, medium 
to large size effect according to Cohen (1992)). No statistically significant association 
with trait anxiety was found for the amygdala.  
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Fig. 4. Functional connectivity as a predictor of trait anxiety: (A) Linear regression between resting-state functional connectivity 
(rs-FC) strength of the right amygdala, basolateral group (β = - 0.322; F (1, 100) = 11.55, p < 0.001; r
2
 = 0.104) and STAI trait 
anxiety scores normalized. High trait anxious individuals show reduced connectivity with the Amygdala. (B) Linear regression 
between rs-FC strength of the right hippocampus (β = - 0.215; F (1, 100) = 4.83, p < 0.05; r
2
 = 0.046) and STAI trait anxiety 
scores normalized. High trait anxious individuals show reduced connectivity with the Hippocampus. 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Independent component (IC) maps representing the default mode network (DMN) detected by group-independent 
component analysis (ICA) in Melodic (FSL) (42 subjects) in the replication sample. Statistical images are z values overlaid on a 
MNI152 brain template. 
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Fig. 6. Analyses in the replication sample (A) Negative correlation between resting-state functional connectivity (rsFC) strength 
of the right amygdala, (r = - 0.49, p = 0.006) and differential skin conductance responses (SCRs) in microsiemens (μS) during 
cue conditioning. (B) Negative correlations between rsFC strength of the right hippocampus  (r = - 0.37, p = 0.03) and differential 
SCRs in μS during context conditioning. 
 
 
 
Table 3. Peak voxels (MNI coordinates), t-values and cluster size of brain areas (part of the DMN), which significantly correlated 
with differential skin conductance responses (SCRs) during cue conditioning.  
 
Brain areas (CUE) X (mm) Y (mm) Z (mm) t-values Cluster size (voxels) 
Right Amygdala 
Left Amygdala 
26 
-18 
-2 
-2 
-8 
-16 
2.89 
4.69 
10 
 
 
Table 4. Peak voxels (MNI coordinates), t-values and cluster size of hippocampal region of interest (part of the DMN), which 
significantly correlated with differential skin conductance responses (SCRs) during context conditioning.  
 
Brain areas 
(CONTEXT) 
X 
(mm) 
Y 
(mm) 
Z 
(mm) 
t-
values 
Cluster size 
(voxels) 
Right Hippocampus 22 -30 0 3.10 35 
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Discussion 
 
We investigated the association between the strength of functional connectivity in the 
DMN and two central associative learning mechanisms – cue and context 
conditioning. Different brain patterns at rest, one including the amygdala and the 
other one including the hippocampal formation, were found to be differentially 
associated with cue and context conditioning. In particular, we showed that increases 
in connectivity within the DMN, with prefrontal and limbic regions (amygdala) were 
negatively associated with cue conditioning scores while connectivity between 
sensory-motor regions and the hippocampus were negatively correlating with context 
conditioning scores. These two experimental models of associative aversive learning 
can be seen as the two sides, phasic/discrete and sustained/continuous, of a 
continuum of phenomena involved in processing environmental threats (Grillon, 
2002a). The DMN is active during internal processing and mind wandering but at the 
same time it supports a state of readiness to situational demands. We showed that 
strength in connectivity of the main reported DMN regions with key regions relevant 
for affective learning is associated with less capacity in distinguishing dangerous and 
safe stimuli, possibly easing generalization phenomena. This also suggests that 
reduced connectivity between the DMN and regions relevant for aversive learning at 
rest is a good indicator of better discriminability, as shown before, while assessing 
dangerous and safe cues separately (Marstaller et al., 2017). Accordingly, 
connectivity strength of amygdala and hippocampus with the DMN was also a good 
predictor of trait anxiety. While at rest and not engaged in any specific task or 
thought, processes strengthening fear and anxiety learning might still be at play. 
Importantly, our findings can help in differentiating the role that amygdala and 
hippocampus, key regions essential for affective processing, might play also at rest in 
association with respect to different aversive associative learning mechanisms in 
healthy controls. This distinction may be of further interest to explore in elucidating 
intrinsic individual network differences that may at rest represent vulnerability factors 
for developing a certain anxiety disorder, along the wide and heterogeneous 
spectrum they belong to, from specific phobias to generalized anxiety disorders. 
In cue conditioning, during early acquisition, we found, according to our hypotheses, 
a network including the amygdala, the mPFC and occipital areas, which was 
negatively correlated with differential SCRs between CS+unpaired/CS-, the latter 
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directly representing an autonomic measure of strength of the learnt aversive 
association. The stronger the connectivity among these regions at rest, the less was 
the differentiation between safe and threat signals in the subjects while they were 
engaged in a fear conditioning task. People who showed this pattern at rest might be 
less able to discriminate a specific potential danger when encountered. 
Other neuroimaging studies pointed out the relevance of functional connections 
between the PFC, either in its dorsolateral (Kim and Hamann, 2007; Eippert et al., 
2007), or medial subdivisions (for a review see (Ochsner and Gross, 2005)), while 
delineating the neural circuitry underlying the regulation of conditioned fear and 
supporting a general role for this region in mediating inhibition of the amygdala 
response.  
In context conditioning during early acquisition, as expected, the hippocampus was 
involved in the association within the DMN and conditionability SCR indices. The 
stronger the connectivity of the hippocampus and sensory-motor areas with the DMN, 
the less was the capability of the subjects in distinguishing between safe and 
dangerous contexts. This is in accordance with other resting state studies in PTSD, 
where altered hippocampal connections with frontal, temporal and parietal brain 
areas have been associated with symptom severity (Dunkley et al., 2014; Spielberg 
et al., 2015). Interestingly, increased resting state connectivity of the DMN with the 
amygdala and the hippocampus may also negatively and separately predict trait 
anxiety, strengthening the notion that they represent different aspects of fear and 
anxiety learning. Individuals high in trait anxiety showed reduced connectivity within 
the DMN with amygdala and hippocampus, connectivity with these regions is known 
to be relevant not only for aversive learning but also for anxiety psychopathology (for 
a review see (Lissek, 2012)). This is also in line with previous fMRI literature on 
conditioning and anxiety in healthy individuals (Indovina et al., 2011), using task-
based analyses.  
The negative association between trait anxiety and functional connectivity of the 
amygdala within the DMN was found in previous studies (Kim et al., 2011). Our 
association between amygdala functional connectivity and trait anxiety could not be 
replicated in our independent sample. This might be related to the smaller sample 
size or the different recruitment strategy. However, other studies also found not 
entirely consistent associations. For example, Kim et al. (2011), reported a significant 
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amygdala-mPFC association with state anxiety measures and a more controversial 
one with trait anxiety. They also found a dissociation between connectivity of the 
amygdala with the dorsomedial or ventromedial PFC with one showing a positive and 
the other a negative correlation with anxiety. Similarly, another study investigating 
insular-amygdalar connectivity reported state and trait anxiety as being differentially 
linked to dynamic functional and more static structural neural aspects (Baur et al., 
2013). Future studies need to differentiate the specific pathways of amygdala 
connectivity that might be necessary to fully highlight the important role this region 
plays as part of different fear- and anxiety-related networks and associated anxiety 
measures. 
Whereas we observed a negative association between trait anxiety and the functional 
connectivity of the right hippocampus in the discovery sample, we found a positive 
association between trait anxiety and the connectivity of the left hippocampus in the 
replication sample. This finding, while supporting the association between the 
hippocampal formation and trait anxiety in healthy individuals, leads to a more 
cautious interpretation of our results and raises interesting questions regarding the 
functional lateralization of the hippocampal formation. Recent studies already started 
to investigate this issue also at the level of task independent functional connectivity 
showing that the left hippocampus is part of a fronto-limbic network and that the right 
hippocampus is instead involved in a larger integrated network of areas that includes 
the right insula, the right caudate, the thalamus and bilateral lentiform nuclei 
(Robinson et al., 2016). Moreover, other studies supported the hypothesis of a 
hemispheric specialization of the hippocampal formation associating verbal memory 
with the left and spatial memory with the right hippocampus (Ezzati et al., 2016; 
Ushakov et al., 2016). The dissociation found in our study might reflects these 
different aspects, as individuals high in trait anxiety might be more prone to 
sequential processing due to higher connectivity with the left hippocampus while at 
the same time reduced connectivity with right hippocampus might be related to worse 
spatial processing. Both might lead to differences in handling uncertainty and 
unpredictability. The differential correlations in our samples might also be related to 
the different sample sizes and recruitment strategies. Further investigation is needed 
to clarify these aspects of network lateralization with respect to fear and anxiety 
learning.  
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Taken together our results suggest that a high non task-related engagement may 
hinder task performance, maybe due to the intrinsic processing already present at 
rest (de Voogd et al., 2017; von Rhein et al., 2017). This strengthens the proposition 
that the development of phasic fear and tonic anxiety may be modeled by 
experimental paradigms involving cued and contextual fear conditioning (Duval et al., 
2015; Grillon, 2002b, 2008; Indovina et al., 2011). This is also in line with previous 
structural studies in which a dissociable role of amygdala and hippocampus for cue 
and context conditioning was described (Cacciaglia et al., 2014). We suggest that 
people who have a higher connectivity between the hippocampus and sensory-motor 
areas at rest are less able to deal with sustained anxiety and unpredictability 
(anticipatory) when exposed to threat even if they are able to acquire discrete fear 
memories. This was shown from the inverse directionality of our correlation between 
hippocampus and cue and context learning measures. In line with previous studies 
(for review (Duval et al., 2015)), our results add to the differentiation of these two 
qualitatively distinct types of learning, produced by different learning conditions and 
support the notion that these mechanisms might differently relate to anxiety disorders 
(Mineka and Oehlberg, 2008; Nees et al., 2015). 
The predictive value of indices of the strength of conditionability has been 
successfully related to the likelihood of developing mood and anxiety disorders 
(Indovina et al., 2011), and was often directly correlated with the amount of 
symptoms in clinical samples (Steiger et al., 2015). Here we clarified that different 
patterns of activity of the DMN are associated with different emotional learning and 
modulatory processes in humans. Resting state networks are associated with many 
known brain functions including sensory, cognitive or reward processes (Beckmann 
et al., 2005; Schmidt et al., 2015; Smith et al., 2009). An increase or decrease in 
connectivity in brain networks at rest or during disengagement from tasks was 
already shown to predict reactivity during specific tasks, as described in many studies 
(Feng et al., 2013; Schultz et al., 2012), and in line with our interpretation. 
For the ratings, we found a significant negative correlation between PCC and 
precuneus and differential US expectancy values, such that higher connectivity in 
these regions related to lower awareness in discriminating CSþ and CS-. 
Interestingly, the PCC and precuneus have been shown to be part of the so-called 
DMN (Beckmann et al., 2005), and have been associated with the processing of and 
creation of a representation of the environment (Gusnard et al., 2001). In addition, we 
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found a negative correlation between the DMN (including the thalamus) and 
differential arousal values in extinction.  
Taken together these results show the essential role of the hippocampal formation in 
integrating sensory inputs. Because of the unpredictability of the US, contextual fear 
conditioning has been described as inducing a state of chronic anticipatory anxiety 
(Grillon, 2008) which might be reduced when a better encoding and integration of 
contextual spatio-temporal inputs is achieved. 
Moreover, a better understanding of the association between brain networks at rest 
and responses to threat exposure, cue- or context-related, may be of great 
importance in identifying vulnerability factors involved in the etiology and 
maintenance of stress and anxiety disorders such as PTSD (Flor and Nees, 2014). 
Specific phobias or panic disorder could be related to phasic fear while posttraumatic 
stress disorder and generalized anxiety disorder to more diffuse and sustained 
anxiety. Studies using longitudinal designs to collect pre- and post-morbid 
conditioning rates among anxiety-disordered individuals (of which this study belongs) 
are needed in order to test the predictive value of these assumptions. 
Some limitations exist in this work. In cue conditioning, during early acquisition, the 
association between the DMN and differential SCRs was observed at an uncorrected 
threshold. This outcome is comparable with a previous study investigating resting 
state metabolism in association with autonomic fear responses during fear acquisition 
(Linnman et al., 2012). Our results are also in line with previous literature on task-
based fMRI stating that the amygdala, mPFC and orbitofrontal cortex have a central 
influence and are closely related to the control and expression of SCRs (Cheng et al., 
2007; Linnman et al., 2012). 
The participants in this study were predominantly male. An unpaired t-test analysis 
on the connectivity maps showed no significant differences for the regions of interest. 
We attempted to further control for these effects by repeating the analyses and 
removing variances that could be explained by gender using general linear models. 
These yielded no significant differences in our regions of interest. Nevertheless, we 
believe that future gender balanced studies will better resolve potential gender 
related differences. 
Finally, although our sample was part of a longitudinal study on predictors of 
developing PTSD, our participants were healthy at the date of the measurement and 
we cannot derive direct conclusions with respect to clinical populations. Further 
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research and longitudinal assessments are needed to understand to what extent the 
DMN characteristics we observed are vulnerability factors or consequences of the 
conditioning and anxiety measures. Such information could help to understand the 
development of anxiety disorders. 
 
Conclusion 
 
We showed that, while DMN connectivity with the amygdala and the mPFC appears 
to be associated with the strength of learning of discrete cues, mediating phasic fear 
learning and an immediate response system, DMN connectivity at rest with the 
hippocampal formation together with sensory-motor areas may be more involved in 
contextual learning mechanisms, related to sustained states of anxiety. Moreover, 
DMN functional connectivity with both amygdala and hippocampus was separately 
predictive of trait anxiety scores. Thus, a better understanding of these dysregulation 
mechanisms and how they interact in the development and maintenance of fear and 
anxiety might provide important insights not only on the pathophysiology of these 
disorders (Indovina et al., 2011; Schiller et al., 2010) but also into designing more 
successful treatment strategies. Resting state networks could be considered useful 
biomarkers of the association between brain activity patterns and 
psychophysiological reactivity and in a longitudinal perspective might be predictors of 
developing stress and anxiety disorders. 
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Appendix A. Supplementary data 
 
Supplementary data related to this article can be found at 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2017.10.024.   
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Default mode network connectivity of fear- and anxiety-related cue 
and context conditioning.  
 
Supplementary material 
1. Results 
1. 1 Whole brain correlations with SCRs and ratings 
Cue conditioning: 
 
 
Figure 1. Results from dual regression analysis (whole brain correlation with differential contingency ratings): negative 
correlations between the posterior parietal cortex and the precuneous (within the DMN) and differential contingency ratings in 
cue conditioning: p-values corrected< 0.05, slices are shown at [x=  6, y=  -42, z= 40; MNI152 coordinates]) Color bars 
represent signal intensity (one–P-value).  
 
 
Context conditioning: 
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Figure 2. Results from dual regression analysis (whole brain correlation with differential arousal ratings): negative correlations 
between the thalamus (within the DMN) and differential arousal ratings in context conditioning (p-values corrected< 0.05; [x= 6, 
y= -10, z= 4]). Color bars represent signal intensity (one–P-value). 
 
1. 2 Region of interest analysis in the replication sample  
Linear regression analysis between the left hippocampus and trait anxiety: 
 
 
Figure 3.  Linear regression between rs-FC strength of the left hippocampus (β = .42; F(1, 32) = 8.46, p = .006)  and normalized 
STAI trait anxiety-scores. 
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2.2 Study 2: Early atypical encoding of traumatic material in post-traumatic stress 
disorder and its relation to memory impairments: an ERP-eye-tracker 
(preliminary title).2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
2
 Publication: Zidda, F., Steiger, F., Winkelmann, T., Ruttorf, M., Andoh, J., Nees, F. and Flor, H.: 
Early atypical encoding of traumatic material in post-traumatic stress disorder and its relation to 
memory impairments: an ERP-eye-tracker study. Manuscript in preparation for submission. 
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Abstract 
 
Objective: Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is characterized by an exaggerated 
response to trauma-relevant cues and an impaired processing of contexts. However, 
it is not clear if this dysfunction is related to memory processes or if the encoding of 
cues and contexts is already impaired. 
Method: We examined encoding and retrieval of trauma-related cues and neutral 
contexts in patients with PTSD and traumatized controls without PTSD (NPTSD) 
using simultaneous high-density electroencephalography and eye-tracking. After 
encoding on day 1, retrieval for known and unknown cue-context associations was 
assessed. In order to control the trauma-specificity of these effects we used trauma-
unrelated cues and neutral contexts as a control condition. 
Results: Our analyses revealed an early difference in the morphology of the scalp 
event-related potentials (ERPs) of the earliest visual deflection (C1) to trauma cues in 
PTSD compared to NPTSD. Moreover, PTSD but not NPTSD looked significantly 
faster at the trauma cues than at the contexts as indicated by the time to first fixation 
of the eye-tracker data. The PTSD group also performed significantly worse than the 
NPTSD in retrieving cue/context associations. Memory performance was significantly 
predicted by the ERPs and eye-tracking data related to the processing of contexts. 
This effect was not found for neutral cues. 
Conclusions: We showed that the encoding of cues and contexts contributes 
significantly to the impairment in cue- and context-related memories in PTSD 
patients. Thus, treatments aiming at improving contextual associations need to take 
into account both the encoding and the formation of associations about contextual 
information.  
Key Words 
Posttraumatic stress disorder, attention, eye-tracker, perception, memory, affective 
processing, ERP. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) develops as a response to a traumatic event 
and is characterized by ‘hyper’-arousal, avoidance, intrusive thoughts, nightmares 
and memories related to the traumatic experience and a cluster of symptoms 
regarding negative alterations in cognitions and mood.  
Importantly, it has been proposed that an autobiographical memory disturbance 
exists towards specific trauma aspects occurring at the expense of the contexts, not 
allowing persons to realize that a such trauma reminders in a safe context are no 
longer a threat, causing  PTSD patients to never feel safe (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). 
More specifically, a “dual representation” model of PTSD has been proposed 
(Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996) and recently updated (Brewin, Gregory, Lipton, 
& Burgess, 2010) according to which, an imbalance or even a dissociation between 
sensorial emotionally charged (S-rep) and contextual representation (C-rep) of the 
information is responsible for the mnemonic sequelae (intrusions, flashbacks etc.) of 
the disorder.  
The C-rep, that would be mainly encoded in a view-point independent (allocentric) 
and retrieved in a viewpoint-dependent (egocentric) perspective, is considered to be 
poorly encoded in individuals that develop PTSD or at least poorly associated with 
the related S-reps.  
Other authors, in the same direction, described the existence of elemental and 
conjunctive representations referring to the main salient events and 
backgrounds/contexts of the encoded scene (Rudy, Huff, & Matus-Amat, 2004; Rudy 
& O'Reilly, 2001). Wessa and Flor (2002) theorized that individuals who develop 
PTSD might have impaired contextual processing and (Acheson, Gresack, & 
Risbrough, 2012) suggested that processing in PTSD might depend mostly on an 
elemental representation strategy probably due to impaired hippocampal processing 
that weakens the conjunctive one. Support came also from neurobiological studies 
showing that the first item-emotion binding process (elemental representation) works 
through upregulation of the amygdala whist the second item-context binding process 
(associative representation) is supported by hippocampal downregulation (Bisby, 
Horner, Horlyck, & Burgess, 2016). This hippocampal impairment would also explain 
why these patients cannot correctly differentiate dangerous and safe contexts (Rudy, 
2009). 
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Consequently, while these aspects have been extensively investigated in memory 
tasks, also with EEG studies (Tsivilis, Otten, & Rugg, 2001), early perceptual and 
attentional processes that could account for this mnemonic bias have not been 
thoroughly investigated, in PTSD and in light of these influential 
elemental/conjunctive theories.  
S-rep, unitary and elemental representations are individually encoded perceptions in 
the different sensorial modalities (such as tactile, visual, odor, spatial or temporal 
stimuli) selected as salient (emotionally charged) (Brewin, 2014), while conjunctive 
representation would refer to an integrated perception of the different elements 
associated together and with the environment in a more abstract unstructured form 
(Acheson et al., 2012; Rudy et al., 2004). 
Perceptual and attentional top-down modulation has been shown at very early stages 
of visual processing involving the very first hundreds milliseconds (ms) of the 
processing stream (Kelly, Gomez-Ramirez, & Foxe, 2008; Rauss, Pourtois, 
Vuilleumier, & Schwartz, 2009). Indeed, effects of affective material have been 
shown already in the amplitudes and polarity of the C1, the first identified visual 
deflection, and in its sources (Keil et al., 2007; Stolarova, Keil, & Moratti, 2006). A 
distinct characteristic of C1 is its polarity reversal when stimuli are presented in 
different parts of the visual field (e.g. upper versus lower or different hemi-fields) 
(Clark, Fan, & Hillyard, 1994; Jeffreys & Axford, 1972). Therefore, C1 changes would 
suggest not only learning-induced neural plasticity in one or more primary visual 
areas of V1–V3 (Zhang, Li, Song, & Yu, 2015) due to a bias towards traumatic 
information but would also represent an indicator of the processed part of the visual 
field, such as cue and context. Therefore, if changes in early perceptual modulations 
occur in PTSD, these might be indicated by polarity inversions of the C1. 
Eye tracker studies were used to validate attentional (hypervigilance-avoidance) 
models in anxiety disorders (Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, 
& Mathews, 1988) and are also suited to analyze early processing related to cues 
and contexts in PTSD. 
We aimed at examining perceptual and attentional processes and the way they could 
differently interact with memory by combining eye-tracker and EEG recordings during 
free viewing of traumatic cues embedded in neutral contexts (suggested as a more 
ecological way than separating them (Williams et al., 1988). This encoding session 
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was followed by a memory test on the same material controlled manipulating 
cue/context associations. 
We expected an excessive focus on trauma-related cues at the expense of the 
context to cause early perceptual biases in PTSD compared to NPTSD as visible in 
the modulation of polarity/amplitudes of the visual C1 and in eye tracking early 
fixation measures. Referring to the memory performance we expected the PTSD 
group to better retrieve pictures requiring a more elemental/unitary strategy (aka 
where the association between cues and contexts was kept constant) and 
consequently in being especially worse than NPTSD in retrieving cue-context 
modified associations. We finally expected a link between different perceptual and 
attentional strategies in PTSD possibly accounting for the memory performance. 
Specifically, we expected EEG amplitudes and eye-tracker contextual data to predict 
memory for cue-context associations while ERP and eye-tracker of cue could predict 
memory processes for the more elemental based pictures. 
 
METHOD 
 
Participants 
We compared 20 PTSD patients (12 female; mean age 41.85, s.d. 8.72, range 30–55 
years) and 20 trauma-exposed healthy subjects without PTSD (NPTSD: trauma 
control group) (13 female; mean age 44.40, s.d. 12.58, range 19–62 years). The 
PTSD patients were recruited via the outpatient clinic of the Central Institute of 
Mental Health, Mannheim and self-referred based on press coverage and information 
on the web site of the institution. None of the participants was medicated and all were 
clinically screened by trained psychologists. The traumatized persons had 
experienced various types of single episode traumatic experiences (see Supplement 
for detailed sample information). 
Procedure 
The participants underwent to a two-day experimental paradigm. On day 1, 
imultaneous high density 128-Channel EEG and eye-tracker recordings were 
performed during free viewing of visual stimuli (see below and the Supplemental 
Methods section for details). On day 2, they participated in a memory test of the 
pictures seen on the previous day. After the memory test, we collected self-report 
data of valence, arousal, self-relevance and self-reported item/background 
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prevalence to assess to which they paid more attention; see below and the 
Supplemental Methods section where details on the ratings and further 
neuropsychological and psychometric assessments are given). 
 
Simultaneous EEG and eye-tracking paradigm (day 1): stimuli 
In order to create a well-tailored trauma-related picture set 30 traumatic cues per 
trauma type were embedded in neutral contexts (details in the Supplement). The 
presentation of every image lasted 6 seconds. The inter-trial (ITI) interval was varying 
from 2 to 4 seconds. 
 
Memory paradigm (day 2): stimuli 
On the second day, the subjects performed a memory test including five picture 
categories composed of 24 slides each (see below) (identical – new/new – new/old – 
old/new – old/old). Stimulus size was 1024 X 768 pixels. 
The pictures were created manipulating the presence of old/new cues and contexts 
and their association in order to assess the different impact of the cue/context 
manipulation on memory retention. The identical category simply included pictures 
which were exactly the same as the day before; the new-new category referred to 
pictures not seen on the previous day; new-old and old-new categories included an 
old cue inserted in a new background and a new cue inserted in a previously seen 
background; in the old-old category, both, cue and context were already seen on the 
previous day but rearranged in a different pair (i.e., the cue was in a different context 
and the context was paired with a different cue). 
Every image was shown for 6 seconds, followed by a forced choice with the following 
question “Please choose which one of the following sentences better describes this 
picture”. The answers included: identical (the same pair), completely new (a new 
pair), context old (only the background is old), cue old (only the object is old) or both 
old, cue and context (the rearranged pair).   
 
 
Structural magnetic resonance imaging (MRI)  
Based on previous findings on hippocampal volume in PTSD (Logue et al., 2018) and 
work on the role of hippocampal and amygdala volume in cue and context learning 
(Cacciaglia, Pohlack, Flor, & Nees, 2015; Maren et al., 2013; Pohlack et al., 2012), 
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amygdala and hippocampal volumes were assessed in a subgroup of 17 participants 
(9 PTSD, 8 NPTSD) who were willing to participate in a separate structural scan 
session and  related to the picture processing and retrieval (see Supplement for 
details). 
 
Data analysis 
EEG 
The EEG data were analyzed off-line with EEGLAB (Delorme & Makeig, 2004) 
running under Matlab 8.2 (The Mathworks) (see Supplement). Independent 
component source locations were estimated by creating an equivalent current dipole 
model for each component with the DIPFIT 2.2 (EEGLAB plug-in using Fieldtrip 
toolbox functions, (Oostenvelt, 2003)) that estimates dipole location by applying 
inverse source modeling methods to a standard boundary element head model using 
the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) template. Only components with scalp maps 
with <15% residual variance from the best fitting forward model scalp projection were 
considered for further analysis.  
The scalp channel data were computed using conventional trial averaging 
procedures within the STUDY structure in EEGLAB. Stimulus-locked ERPs were 
computed for each subject and channel followed by grand-average channel ERPs for 
each group. In order to specifically assess early visual activity, peak-to-baseline 
mean values were extracted from parieto-occipital and occipital posterior channels 
and grouped in  two hemispheric clusters (E63,E64,E65,E66,E68,E69,E70,E73,E74; 
for the left and E82,O2,E84,E89,E90,E94,E95, E99 for the right hemisphere), which 
are all surrounding and approximating Oz and averaged according to the latency of 
interest ( 20 - 60ms) (Braeutigam, Bailey, & Swithenby, 2001; Foxe & Simpson, 
2002; Weymar, Keil, & Hamm, 2014).  A mixed ANOVA was used with hemisphere 
(left, right) as within-subject factor and group (PTSD, NPTSD) as between factor in 
order to test for differences in the C1 mean amplitudes. 
 
EYE-TRACKING 
A mixed ANOVA was applied to the eye-tracking total time to first fixation data 
(TTtFF; see Supplement for more details) with cue/context values as within-subject 
factor and group as between-subject factor. 
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MEMORY 
Singles values for each of the five memory categories (identical, new/new, new/old, 
old/new and old/old) were summed up and then averaged, in order to have a single 
value per category and subject. Moreover, following our theoretical assumptions 
regarding memory for items and memory for context/item associations, we computed 
a confirmatory factor analysis on the five mentioned subcategories which showed 
that two main factors were separately accounting for the variance present in the data. 
Based on these results, we combined the 5 categories into 2 more global categories: 
the first one (called  “Item” = identical + newnew) represented the memory for 
pictures in which the association between cue and context was kept constant and 
thus, could rely on the processing of the main element without explicit association 
with the context; the second one (called “Association” = new/old + old/new + old/old) 
represented  categories where the correct association between the cue and context 
was needed to retrieve the correct response. This allowed to more clearly 
differentiate between the weight of cue/context in a more elemental versus a more 
conjunctive associative representation. 
 
MRI 
We extracted  the volume of subcortical brain structures using the Freesurfer 6.0 
image analysis suite (Dale, Fischl, & Sereno, 1999) (see Supplement for details). 
Independent sample t-tests two-tailed with p< 0.05 were used. One-tailed Pearson 
correlations with the memory performance (item and association) were also tested. 
 
Multiple hierarchical regressions 
In order to assess the effect of the encoding, as recorded via EEG and eye-tracking, 
on the memory performance on the second day, we employed two multiple 
hierarchical regressions. In one regression model, we used the memory scores for 
the category association as dependent variable and in the second model the memory 
scores for the item category. Independent variables included the eye-tracker TTtFF 
values for cue and context and the C1 ERP amplitudes. These variables were initially 
entered alone and then in blocks in order to highlight the respective proportion of 
change in the explained variance of the dependent variable.  
Outliers which had studentized residual values above  2.8 SD (N = 3; one in the 
memory category association, two in the TTtFF of cue and context), were replaced by 
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the mean. Logarithmic transformations and range corrections were used when 
necessary to achieve normality. All statistical analyses were performed in IBM SPSS 
Statistics for Windows version 20.0 the statistical significance level was set to p < 
.05. 
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RESULTS 
 
Encoding of combined cues and contexts ERPs 
In the ERPs, we identified a very early C1 deflection in the trauma category with an 
onset peaking at  ̴ 40 ms, maximal over posterior parieto-occipital and occipital sites. 
The main effect of group showed that there was a statistically significant difference in 
the mean of the C1 amplitude between the PTSD and NPTSD groups F(1, 30) = 
4,939, p < .05, partial η2 = .141. The early C1 was statistically significantly different 
(more positive) in the PTSD compared to the NPTSD group (negative) for both the 
left and right clusters (Fig. 1ABCD). There was no statistically significant interaction 
between laterality (left, right) and group (PTSD, NPTSD), nor a laterality main effect 
(resp: F(1, 30) = 0,119, p = .732, partial η2 = .004; F(1, 30) = 0,254, p = .732, partial 
η2 = .042).  
 
 
Fig. 1: (A) Grand average event-related potentials (ERPs) for left and right parieto-
occipital clusters, highlighted in grey is the time window of the C1 that was 
significantly different between the post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and the 
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traumatized control group (NPTSD). (B) Scalp maps at specified latencies in the 
PTSD (orange) and NPTSD (black) groups. (C) Mean waveform of the two clusters 
showing the entire epoch and the identified visual components. (D) Layout of the 
electrode array, in blue the electrodes used for statistical analyses with midline 
electrodes separating right and left clusters. 
 
The independent components were grouped into several clusters on the basis of 
dipole location, power, average ERP in the 20-60 ms window of interest, mean Event 
Related Spectral Perturbation (ERSP) and Inter-Trial phase coherence as shown in 
other studies (Milne, Scope, Pascalis, Buckley, & Makeig, 2009).  
Six clusters of components explained most of the variance in our ERP epoch 
following stimulus onset (see Fig.2). Two clusters had dipoles that were primarily 
located in the visual cortex. The other clusters were located laterally and medially 
subcortically in line with limbic anterior (ACC), posterior cingulate (PCC), and 
subcortical (Thalamus and Hippocampus) regions, (see Table 1). Mean dipole 
locations and dipole clusters are shown in Fig.4. The approximated estimated 
Talairach coordinates, as defined in the Yale BioImage Suite software website 
(http://www.bioimagesuite.org), and the nearest grey matter of the mean equivalent 
current dipole of each cluster are presented in Table 1 comparable to those from 
previous studies (Milne et al., 2009; Rissling et al., 2014). 
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Fig. 2: Equivalent dipole localization plots showing the centroid of (left) and the 
source cluster (right) of each independent component (IC) in the Montreal 
Neurological Institute (MNI) template brain. 
  
 62 
 
Table 1: Talaiarach coordinates and nearest grey matter to the average dipole 
location of each of the four clusters of independent components. 
Cluster 
number 
Tailarach Coordinates 
X                        Y                      Z 
Lobe Nearest Grey Matter 
5 7 -67 14 R-mid 
Occipital 
Primary visual cortex 
10 34 -61 6 R Occipital Associative cortex 
8 -22 -41 8 L 
Temporal 
Hippocampus 
6 13 -9 -5 Subcortical Thalamus 
3 7 26 15 R Limbic Anterior cingulate 
17 3 -40 43 R-mid 
Limbic 
Posterior cingulate 
 
 
Eye-tracking results 
There was a statistically significant interaction between the TTtFF to traumatic 
cue/neutral context and group, F(1,35) = 5.121, p < .05, partial η2 = .128 (Fig. 3A). 
The PTSD group was looking slower at the context compared to the NPTSD group. 
 
Memory results 
We found a significant memory per group interaction, F(1, 36) = 4.956, p < .05, partial 
η2 = .121 (Fig. 3B). Compared to the NPTSD group, the PTSD group was worse at 
retrieving pictures of the association category than the ones of the item category. 
 
Structural subcortical MRI results in a selected sample 
The PTSD group showed significantly smaller hippocampal volumes (t(15)= -2.330; 
p< 0.05) but not smaller amygdalar volume (t(15)= -1.153; ns.) compared to NPTSD 
group. We found a significant negative correlation between hippocampal volume and 
memory for the item category (r= -.44; p< .05). 
 
Hierarchical regression results 
Memory for the category association: 
The full model (model 3) with encoding measures, C1 mean ERP peaks (left and 
right), cued and contextual eye-tracking TTtFF, statistically significantly predicted the 
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mean memory association scores (model 3). R2 = .551, F(4, 27) = 7.054, p < .005; 
adjusted R2 = .473. The addition time to first contextual  but not cue  fixation  (model 
2)  to the ERP C1 data led to statistically significant increase in the prediction of 
memory association, resulting in a R2 of .196, F(3, 27) = 9.811, p < .0005 (see 
Table 2). 
Memory for the category complex item: 
No model was able to significantly predict the performance in this memory category. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3: (A) Mean eye-tracking time to first fixation. PTSD patients look earlier at the 
cue and significantly later at the context compared with the NPTSD group (B) PTSD 
patients perform significantly worse in correctly retrieving cue/context modified 
associations compared to  cue/context unmodified items. 
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Table 2: Hierarchical regression between perceptual and attentional measures and 
memory performance of cue/context associations (* = p< .05; **= p<.005; ***= 
p<.0005). 
Criterion 
Variable 
Memory 
Association category 
Model N 
predictors 
R2 p< Change in 
R2 
R2 p< 
1  
C1 
(right/left)  
2 0.355 0.005**  - 
2 
C1 
(right/left) 
Eye-tracker 
context 
3 0.551 0.0005*** 
 
 
 
0.196 
 
0.005** 
3 
C1 
(right/left) 
Eye-tracker 
context  
Eye-tracker 
cue 
4 0.551 0.005** 0.003 0.954 
 
Control condition results 
In the ERP data, it was not possible to reliably identify the early C1 deflection in the 
neutral non-traumatic category. There was no statistically significant interaction for 
neutral cues/neutral context and group (F(1,35) = 1.135, n.s., partial η2 = .031) either 
in the eye-tracker data nor there for neutral cues/neutral context and group (F(1,36) = 
.256, n.s., partial η2 = .007) in the memory performance. 
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DISCUSSION 
 
We investigated encoding and retrieval of competing realistic information (trauma 
cues embedded in neutral contexts) in PTSD compared to traumatized NPTSD 
controls. 
Our data on the earliest visual ERP (C1), the time to first fixation and the retrieval of 
cue/context manipulations indicate that contextual processing is impaired in PTSD 
compared to NPTSD. The poorer performance for memory of cue/context 
associations was also predicted by poorer contextual encoding  
 
During encoding of the pictures, PTSD patients showed a very early perceptual 
difference in the polarity of the first identified visual ERP deflection (C1) in 
comparison to traumatized controls, who did not develop PTSD. The C1 has been 
described with latencies ranging between 40 and 70 ms (see (Woodman, 2010) for a 
review) for complex stimuli. Changes in the polarity of the C1 deflection were related 
to upper/lower visual field sensory processing due to its retinotopic properties also in 
recent studies (Bayer et al., 2017; Di Russo et al., 2012). In the case of complex 
stimuli such as pictures, the changes in polarity could be related to the processing of 
different but concurrent information in the visual field competing for neural 
representation (West, Anderson, Ferber, & Pratt, 2011). Our results indicate that 
PTSD processing starts from the emotional cues in the lower part at the expense of 
the context in the upper and surrounding parts of the visual field, while NPTSD show 
the opposite effect. The amplitude of the C1 deflection has also been associated 
before with affective top-down modulation in aversive learning (Stolarova et al., 
2006), anxiety states and emotional processing (Rossi & Pourtois, 2012), perceptual 
learning (Zhang et al., 2015) and reward/motivation (Bayer et al., 2017). One study in 
particular showed C1 emotional modulation (in the 30–60 ms window) for fearful 
faces while they were competing with multiple complex stimuli (showed 
simultaneously) with a bias for fearful faces (West et al., 2011). Another study that 
focused on early perceptual processing of emotionally salient material compared 
anxious and non-anxious individuals and also found early differences in the C1 
amplitude with latencies starting at 20 ms (Weymar et al., 2014). Yoneda et al. 
(1995), using EEG and magnetoencephalography (MEG),  observed an early, non-
specific visual response at ~ 40 ms after the stimulus, likely generated in the striate 
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cortex (Yoneda, Sekimoto, Yumoto, & Sugishita, 1995). Another MEG study also 
showed that a type and task-dependent (comparison of pairs of faces instead of 
objects or individual faces) early latency (30-60 ms) responses was present 
(Braeutigam et al., 2001). Interestingly and in line with our results, only the task that 
required an association and use of faces versus not neutral objects led to faster and 
higher neural responses. 
Our deflection starts earlier and peaks at around 40 ms. We believe that this might 
show an important characteristic of how emotionally relevant and more ecologically 
valid material is processed. Braeutigam et al. (2001) described the finding of an 
earlier onset for the C1 as consistent with suggestions of anatomical pathways 
between thalamic nuclei and subcortical as well as cortical locations that may be 
activated simultaneously with or even before striate cortex. In our source location 
results, we found that cortical sensory and limbic regions (occipital and cingulate 
regions) as well as subcortical structures (thalamus and hippocampus) explained 
variance in the ERP signal. The anterior and posterior cingulate cortices (ACC, PCC) 
together with prefrontal regions form a fronto-parietal attention network involved in 
amplifying relevant and suppressing irrelevant input, therefore increasing related 
sensory representations (Bayer et al., 2017). 
 
The behavioral eye-tracker results follow the neural ERP results. PTSD patients 
looked faster at cues and significantly slower at the neutral background while the 
NPTSD group did not show a significant temporal difference. This suggests that even 
if both groups look first at cue, the difference is in the contextual processing. These 
results are partially in line with previous studies using eye-tracking that assessed 
differences between stimuli with different valence. One study that compared PTSD 
patients with traumatized and non-traumatized controls showed that there was a 
significant difference in number of first fixations towards traumatic words in the PTSD 
group (Felmingham, Rennie, Manor, & Bryant, 2011). Another study (Thomas, 
Goegan, Newman, Arndt, & Sears, 2013) showed a significant difference in the 
percentage of initial fixations only for trauma-related images between PTSD and HC 
groups, with the traumatized NPTSD group in between not significantly different to 
either of the two other groups. No significant differences in other valenced or neutral 
categories were found. Many studies have shown that PTSD is associated with a 
heightened vigilance and increased attention to threat-related information, collectively 
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referred to as a threat-related attentional bias (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, 
Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 2007; Cisler & Koster, 2010; Felmingham 
et al., 2011; Thomas et al., 2013). However, not many studies have investigated the 
relative ratio between traumatic cue and context-related eye-tracking parameters. 
Our results add to this line of research reporting a cue/context imbalance as a 
sensitive feature in the well reported attentional bias in PTSD.  
The results of the memory tests follow theoretical “dual representation” accounts 
(Acheson et al., 2012; Brewin et al., 2010) of intrusive memories. PTSD patients 
performed significantly worse in retrieving item/background correct associations 
(impaired conjunctive representation) than pictures in which this association was not 
explicitly retrieved compared to NPTSD. This strengthens the idea of a more general 
association bias not directed towards certain parts of the scene only and due to an 
incomplete  contextual processing, as previously proposed (Acheson et al., 2012). A 
recent study that, with fMRI, investigated the neural mechanisms which contribute to 
complex encoding and pattern of memory interaction for emotional events showing 
that memory for the associations between items and between items and their context 
relies on mechanisms that go beyond those supporting memory for a single item but 
in healthy volunteers (Bisby et al., 2016). 
Our results from the control condition using neutral cues show that these effects are 
specific for trauma-related cues. 
Finally, our hierarchical regression results show which of these encoding variables 
are associated with the memory impairment. Only encoding measures associated 
with contextual attentional processing significantly predicted variation in memory 
performance of the association category. 
In conclusion, PTSD patients showed a fast orientation toward the trauma reminder 
and a significantly slower orientation toward the neutral background surrounding it, 
while individuals who did not develop the disorder look fast at the cue but also at the 
contexts. This type of indicator of perceptual processes might be very useful when 
assessing avoidance and generalization phenomena which are important in this 
disorder.  
 
Researchers have already found that PTSD affects how people attend to the world 
around them, both at the perceptual and attentional levels and our findings add to 
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these insights that the encoding bias in cue versus context can also predict the 
memory impairment typical of PTSD. 
In a treatment perspective, we can suggest that if encoding and retrieving certain 
parts of the environment are associated processes, which influence each other, they 
can therefore be targeted and modulated together for faster therapeutic outcomes. 
 
Limitations 
 
This work has some limitations. C1 studies usually require specific paradigms with 
extensive usage of simple stimulus repetition and in different parts of the visual field, 
which is not easy to implement with a clinical sample and using complex stimuli but 
also that goes often at the cost of ecological significance. In the attempt to overcome 
this limitation, we combined shorter EEG recordings with simultaneous eye-tracking 
and usage of ad hoc constructed pictures inclusive of traumatic cues in neutral 
contexts. Further studies with a pure perceptual focus on traumatic cues/contexts are 
needed to further investigate amplitude and morphology of the earliest visual ERP in 
clinical populations. Also, we believe further analyses comparing traumatic cues of 
different emotional valence (negative, positive) again in neutral contexts can better 
elucidate if these mechanisms are specifically trauma-related or not. 
Lastly, we believe understanding how spatial processing and especially how 
subcortical limbic structures contribute to explained variance in the ERP signal is 
worth further consideration.  
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Appendix B. Supplementary data 
Zidda el al. Supplemental data 
METHODS 
Participants 
Patients with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and the trauma control group 
(NPTSD) did not significantly differ in age, handedness or education. PTSD patients 
scored significantly higher in depressive symptoms as well as anxiety levels than 
NPTSD, (see Table 1). All analyses were then rerun using these variables as 
covariates, not changing the significance level of the results. Seven PTSD patients 
met criteria for current major depressive episode (MDE) and seven PTSD patients 
met criteria for panic disorder (PD), social phobia (SP) or specific phobia. Three 
traumatized controls also met criteria for PD, one for SP and one for current MDE. 
The German version of the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I disorders 
(SCID-I) (Wittchen, 1997) was used to assess mental disorders including PTSD. 
Additionally, the German version of the Clinician-Administered PTSD Scale (CAPS; 
(Schnyder & Moergeli, 2002)) was employed to examine the current diagnosis of 
PTSD. Axis II diagnoses were determined using the SCID-II (SKID-II; (Wittchen, 
1997)).The German version of the Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression 
Scale (Hautzinger & Bailer, 1993) was used to assess comorbid depressive 
symptoms. The German version of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory  trait version was 
used in order to assess the level of anxiety (Laux, Glanzmann, Schaffner, & 
Spielberger, 1981). Participants of the trauma control group were only included when 
they had a history of a criterion A trauma for at least 3 months before participation in 
the study. 
Depending on the trauma experienced, the participants belonged to seven trauma 
clusters in total: car accident (PTSD = 4; NPTSD = 6), fire (PTSD = 3; NPTSD =1), 
hospital (PTSD = 1; NPTSD = 2), war (PTSD = 2; NPTSD = 2), rape (PTSD = 7; 
NPTSD = 4), suicide (PTSD = 1; NPTSD = 3), and aggression (PTSD = 2; NPTSD = 
2). 
The participants reported to have slept seven or more hours. Exclusion criteria for 
PTSD patients were comorbid borderline personality disorder, history of 
schizophrenia-spectrum psychosis, bipolar type I affective disorder and current 
substance abuse. Further exclusion criteria for all participants were neurological 
 73 
 
disorders, traumatic head injuries, mental retardation and lack of German language 
skills. 
 
Because of technical reasons and artefacts (less than <75% good epochs) we had to 
exclude 4 subjects per group in the EEG data, 2 subjects in the memory and 3 in the 
eye-tracker-data. 
 
Table 1: Demographic and clinical variables 
 PTSD 
(20) 
NPTSD (20) Statistic 
AGE (years ± sd, 
Range) 
41.50 ± 8.84 (30–
55) 
44.35 ± 12.55 (19–
62) 
t(38) = .461 
SEX (f/m) 11/9 13/7 χ2 =- .745 
CAPS (mean ± sd) 68.05 ± 26.52 10.86 ± 11.92 t(35) = 8.37** 
ADS (mean ± sd) 1.52 ± 0.35 0.63 ± 0.42 t(37) = 7.10** 
STAI (mean ± sd) 57.94 ± 8.65 37.13 ± 9.59 t(37) = 9,22** 
CAPS, Clinician-Administered PTSD Scale ( p < .01 (statistically significant difference 
between PTSD and trauma control). 
ADS-L, General Depression Scale, (P < .01 (statistically significant difference 
between the PTSD group and the other groups). 
STAI-T, State-Trait Anxiety Inventory Trait (P < .01 (statistically significant difference 
between the PTSD group and the other groups). sd= standard deviation. 
 
Stimulus design 
Tailored traumatic cues were mostly taken from the internet and individually rated.  
There was no significant difference in valence, arousal, personal relevance or 
perceived item/background prevalence of the images between the two groups (see 
Table 3). There was no significant difference in any of the low-level image properties 
between the two groups (see Table 2). The traumatic cues were inserted in different 
sort of contexts taken from the internet which were rated as neutral (landscapes, 
interiors of houses, buildings) in an independent validation study. The contexts were 
kept stable across the seven trauma picture categories and the cues were mainly 
placed in the lower part of the picture but alternated with central and upper field 
 74 
 
positions to avoid predictability: lower part 81.46%; upper part 11.46% and central 
part 7.08%. 
Neutral cues3 and contexts4 were taken from different databases, IAPS (Lang, 2008), 
GAPED (Dan-Glauser & Scherer, 2011) and EmoPics (Wessa et al., 2010). 
 
 
EEG data acquisition 
EEG was continuously recorded with a high-density array of 128 silver-silver chloride 
electrodes (Electrical Geodesics, Eugene, Oregon). Impedances were kept below 50 
KΩ, as suggested from the manufacturer. The signal was amplified (x1000), filtered 
online with a band-pass of .01–100 Hz, then digitized at a sampling rate of 1 KHz. 
The electro-oculogram was recorded from bipolar electrode pairs located at the outer 
canthi and above and below the left and right eyes.  
 
 
Eye-tracking data acquisition 
The participants were comfortably seated in front of a table-mounted eye-tracking 
system which was approximately 70 cm away from participants’ faces. In order to 
standardize the distance from the screen and to reduce head movements, which 
would have led to de-calibration issues, participants were asked to sit their chin in a 
headrest put in front of the screen. After successful calibration of the eye-tracking 
system to participants’ eye movement patterns, participants were instructed to watch 
the visual presentation and try to avoid moving or blinking as much as possible. In 
the end of the calibration procedure, the stimulus presentation started (total duration   ̴
20 minutes). Gaze position and fixations measures were recorded continuously 
during the entire length of the experimental task. We used an EAS binocular remote 
system complemented by two eye cameras and an IR light source from LC 
Technologies, Inc., USA (sample rate of 120 Hz, Gaze Position Accuracy <0.45 °; 
Spatial Resolution 0.2°). 
                                            
Neutral cues numbers: i_92,  i_100, i_101; IAPS: 7233, 7009, 7090, 7705, 7950, 7025, 7192, 7038, 
7040, 2870, 7211, 7175, 1450, 7034, 7185; EmoPics: EmoPics 363, EmoPics 
311, EmoPics 284, EmoPics 301, EmoPics 95, EmoPics 319, EmoPics 153, 
EmoPics 159, EmoPics 164.1,,EmoPics 178, EmoPics 158, EmoPics 162.2; 
Contexts numbers:  wo_02, wue_05, rau_15, tu_02, ge_19, tu_11; GAPED: N089, N093, N099, 
N101, N104, N105, N098, N086; IAPS: 5120, 5130, 5390, 5711, 7547. 
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NYAN 2.0 software from Interactive Minds Dresden (IMD) was used for both the 
picture presentation and for registering, recording, and analyzing participants’ eye-
tracker data, using the table-mounted Eyegaze Analysis System from LC 
Technologies Inc. On the second day images and memory responses were 
administered by Presentation™ software (Neurobehavioral Systems Inc., Albany, CA, 
USA). 
 
Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) data acquisition 
Magnetic resonance imaging data were acquired on a 3T MAGNETOM Trio whole 
body scanner (Siemens Medical Solutions, Erlangen, Germany) equipped with a 
standard 12-channel head coil using a T1-weighted magnetization prepared rapid 
gradient echo (MPRAGE) sequence (TR 2300 ms, TE 2.98 ms, field of view 240 x 
256 mm2, 160 sagittal slices, voxel size 1.0 x 1.0 x 1.1 mm, parallel imaging 
(GRAPPA) factor 2). 
 
ERP analyses 
In order to obtain a clean independent component (IC) decomposition, data were 
initially band-pass filtered (1 Hz - 30 Hz), resampled at 256 Hz, cleaned with ASR 
(Artifact Subspace Reconstruction) toolbox (Mullen et al., 2015), segmented into 
epochs of 3 sec (-1–2 sec around stimulus onset) and re-referenced to average 
reference. The remaining data were decomposed by Infomax independent 
component analysis (ICA) with the algorithm “runica” (Makeig, Jung, Bell, 
Ghahremani, & Sejnowski, 1997) as implemented in EEGLAB. The ICA matrix was 
then copied to the original less strongly cleaned data. This allowed obtaining at the 
same time a cleaned ICA decomposition while preserving the signal from possible 
distortion due to high frequency filtering effects. Moreover, ICA allowed retaining as 
much information as possible by allowing cancellation instead of rejection of artifacts 
from the EEG signal. 
The original data were band-pass filtered (0.1 Hz - 30 Hz) using a causal finite 
impulse response filter with half amplitude, resampled at 250 Hz, cleaned from bad 
channels, segmented into epochs of 600 msec (-100–500 msec around stimulus 
onset) on the basis of stimulus type (picture category) and re-referenced to average 
reference. At this stage we copied to each subject their previously ICA computed 
matrix (as suggested on the developers website, 
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https://sccn.ucsd.edu/wiki/Makoto's_preprocessing_pipeline) calculated with 1Hz 
high-pass filtering (Winkler, Debener, Muller, & Tangermann, 2015).  
Any components that reflected muscle activity, electrocardiogram, or eye 
movements, on the basis of their dipole location, spectra and scalp maps were 
considered artefacts and excluded from further analysis. Data were baseline 
corrected by subtracting the mean of the 100-ms pre-stimulus interval. 
Components were grouped into several clusters with a joint distance measure, on the 
basis of dipole locations, power, average ERPs, mean Event Related Spectral 
Perturbation (ERSP) and Inter-Trial phase Coherence (ITC) measures. These data 
from each subject were initially decomposed by Principal Component Analysis (PCA), 
and the resulting component distances were clustered with a k-means algorithm (for 
further details of this method see (Rissling et al., 2014) . 
 
Eye-tracker analysis 
The eye movement parameters total time to first fixation (TTtFF), Total fixation count 
(TFC), mean fixation duration (in ms), total mean fixation duration (TMFD) and 
dwelling time or total gaze duration (TGD: sum of all fixation durations in ms) were 
sampled with the pupil center corneal reflection method and extracted after manually 
tracing the main object called area of interest (AOI) aka CUE, in each image. This 
procedure allowed us to obtain separated values for cues and contexts. 
MRI data analysis 
The processing briefly involved applying a Talairach transformation (Reuter, Rosas, 
& Fischl, 2010; Reuter, Schmansky, Rosas, & Fischl, 2012), motion correction and 
averaging, removal of non-brain tissue using a hybrid watershed/surface deformation 
procedure (Segonne et al., 2004), segmentation of the subcortical white matter and 
deep gray matter volumetric structures (Fischl et al., 2002), intensity normalization, 
tessellation of the gray matter white matter boundary, automated topology correction. 
Once the cortical models were complete, a surface inflation and registration to a 
spherical atlas was performed, which utilized individual cortical folding patterns to 
match cortical geometry across subjects. Individual volumes were adjusted for total 
subcortical volume.  
RESULTS 
Ratings of the stimuli (picture ratings) 
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The self-assessment manikin (SAM; (Bradley & Lang, 1994)) was employed to 
assess arousal and valence of the pictures, and transformed to a 9-point scale 
(ranging from 1 = very calm to 9 = very arousing, 1 = very pleasant to 9 = very 
unpleasant).This was followed by a full neuropsychological and clinical assessment 
(see Table 2). 
Table 2: Picture ratings 
 PTSD NPTSD Statistic 
Arousal 5,41 4,74 t(36) = 1.14 
Valence 6,3 6,14 t(36) = 0.476 
Relevance 4,79 5,68 t(36) = 0.334 
Figure Ground 3,88 4,07 t(36) = 0.168 
 
 
No significant difference in image hue, saturation, brightness, red-green-blue (RGB), 
luminance (p > 0.05) across picture category was found. Regarding the traumatic 
category, ANOVA showed no differences in arousal, valence, figure-ground balance 
scores and relevance between groups (see Table 3).  
 
 
Table 3 
 Trauma 
(acciden
t) 
Trauma 
(aggress
ion) 
Trauma 
(suicide) 
Trauma 
(rape) 
Trauma 
(hospital
) 
Trauma 
(war) 
Trauma 
(fire) 
Hue 
(sd) 
0,35 
(0,08) 
0,35 
(0,09) 
0,33 
(0,10) 
0,35 
(0,10) 
0,36 
(0,08) 
0,34 
(0,10) 
0,33 
(0,11) 
Saturati
on 
(sd) 
0,28 
(0,13) 
0,28 
(0,13) 
0,29 
(0,13) 
0,29 
(0,12) 
0,28 
(0,11) 
0,28 
(0,13) 
0,29 
(0,11) 
Brightne
ss 
(sd) 
0,57 
(0,09) 
0,56 
(0,09) 
0,58 
(0,09) 
0,56 
(0,10) 
0,58 
(0,09) 
0,56 
(0,09) 
0,59 
(0,09) 
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R 
(sd) 
126,56 
(21,73) 
124,59 
(19,29) 
131,13 
(20,83) 
126,44 
(21,30) 
127,28 
(17,56) 
124,50 
(21,24) 
134,51 
(20,69) 
G 
(sd) 
130,98 
(20,96) 
128,72 
(19,81) 
132,27 
(21,38) 
128,57 
(21,51) 
133,19 
(18,70) 
128,35 
(19,04) 
131,99 
(18,26) 
B 
(sd) 
122,95 
(26,38) 
121,31 
(26,27) 
122,76 
(27,78) 
120,95 
(27,71) 
127,28 
(17,56) 
120,23 
(25,20) 
122,72 
(24,96) 
Luminan
ce (sd) 
128,75 
(20,53) 
126,64 
(19,04) 
130,85 
(20,52) 
127,07 
(21,01) 
130,80 
(18,11) 
126,28 
(18,84) 
131,69 
(18,47) 
KB= kilobytes; sd= standard deviation 
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3 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
3.1 Summary of the aims and main results 
We conducted investigations on the role of conditioning and encoding mechanisms in 
the pathogenesis and pathophysiology of anxiety and stress/trauma related disorders 
with a special focus on PTSD.  
 
Study 1 
 
Cued and contextual conditionings are crucial learning mechanisms and recognized 
experimental models of anxiety disorders. Because cued conditioning may better 
model discrete phobic aspects (Indovina et al., 2011) while context conditioning 
better resemble aspects of sustained anxiety (Grillon, 2002a) it has been suggested 
that these two mechanisms might be involved in the development of different 
disorders along the anxiety spectrum (Grillon, 2002b, 2008). 
Moreover, the DMN has been described as facilitating a state of endogenous and 
exogenous monitoring of stimuli, orchestrating shifts to other resting state networks 
(salience or attentional control) depending on necessity (Bar, 2007; Gusnard, 
Akbudak, Shulman, & Raichle, 2001) and possibly also an ongoing processing of 
past events (Miall & Robertson, 2006). Therefore, investigating neurobiological 
individual changes in the pattern of the DMN along with physiological indicators of 
these two associative learning mechanisms can be helpful in elucidating potentially 
pathogenic patterns associated with different anxiety disorders.  
We found that individual differences in DMN network connectivity are associated with 
different psychophysiological patterns during fear and anxiety learning. Interestingly, 
the amygdala and the prefrontal cortex (PFC) are associated with cue conditioning, 
mediating phasic fear learning. The modulatory role of the PFC on the amygdala in 
conditioned fear has been already described in several other fMRI studies, either in 
its dorsolateral (Eippert et al., 2007; Kim & Hamann, 2007), or medial subdivisions 
(Ochsner & Gross, 2005). Moreover it has also been shown that increased resting 
state connectivity of amygdala, ACC and PFC is significantly higher in PTSD 
compared to NPSTD (Brown et al., 2014). In contrast, connectivity of hippocampus 
and sensory-motor regions at rest are associated with contextual conditioning 
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indicators, possibly mediating anxiety learning. Altered hippocampal connectivity with 
frontal, temporal and parietal control regions have been previously associated with 
symptom severity in PTSD (Dunkley et al., 2014; Spielberg, McGlinchey, Milberg, & 
Salat, 2015).The emergence of an interaction within this network with relevant node 
of the well-known an previously described “fear network” (Holzschneider & Mulert, 
2011) opens interesting scenarios towards the role of individual differences in brain 
connectivity at rest, its continuously at play processes interacting with the 
mechanisms altered in anxiety or stress related disorders. In fact, reduced 
connectivity between the DMN and regions relevant for aversive learning at rest has 
proven to be a good discriminability index for both cues and contexts. Something 
similar has been shown before, for dangerous and safe cues (Marstaller, Burianova, 
& Reutens, 2017). 
Further, both, resting state connectivity of amygdala and hippocampus show a 
negative association with trait anxiety in the discovery sample. This results, needs 
further investigation but show a certain potential. Even at rest relevant biological hubs 
and physiological indicators relevant for different fear learning mechanisms (cue and 
context conditioning) are associated with proneness to anxiety and support the idea 
that these mechanisms might differently relate to different anxiety disorders (Mineka 
& Oehlberg, 2008; Nees, Heinrich, & Flor, 2015). 
Connectivity in brain networks at rest has been shown to predict reactivity during 
specific tasks (T. Feng, Feng, & Chen, 2013; Schultz et al., 2012) and in this 
perspective might become a useful tool and target for understanding resilience and 
vulnerability to anxiety and trauma-related disorders.  
 
 
Study 2 
 
Encoding mechanisms (responsible for extracting, selecting and organizing internal 
and external information) regarding the traumatic cues and its contexts, have not yet 
been investigated in PTSD. We also know little about the interaction of these 
mechanisms with the well reported dual representation memory impairment (Brewin, 
1996; Brewin & Burgess, 2014) in PTSD. 
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EEG recordings and ERP analysis are well suited to study real-time information 
processing, perceptual and attentional patterns at the neural level and the C1 is the 
first visual component that also responds to different stimulus locations (Clark et al., 
1994; Jeffreys & Axford, 1972). Furthermore, eye-tracking methodologies have been 
fruitfully used to highlight behavioral attention profiles towards traumatic contents in 
PTSD (Felmingham et al., 2011), in a more spontaneous and ecological way than 
requiring verbal or motor responses. 
 
Therefore, we investigated encoding mechanisms in PTSD compared to NPTSD 
traumatized controls, combining eye-tracking and EEG recordings during free viewing 
of ecologically valid material (traumatic cues embedded in neutral ecological 
backgrounds). Moreover, in order to test for the specificity of this effect towards 
trauma-related material we also included neutral cues. 
 
We found an early encoding bias in PTSD. Both, at the perceptual level, in the 
morphology of the first visual ERP component, the C1, (positive in polarity for PTSD 
and negative for NPTSD), and at the behavioral attentional level, in the time to first 
fixation biased to cues at the expense of the contexts to a higher extent in PTSD than 
NPTSD.  
Due to its retinotopic properties, polarity inversion of the C1 has been found to reflect 
upper/lower visual field sensory processing (Clark et al., 1994; Jeffreys & Axford, 
1972) also in recent studies (Bayer et al., 2017; Di Russo et al., 2012). This studies 
involved the use of simple stimuli displayed in different hemifields and/or quadrants 
but it has been proposed that a polarity reversal for complex stimuli with adaptive 
relevance would refer to the processing of competing information in the visual field 
with associated neural representations (West et al., 2011). Thus, while individuals 
with PTSD start to atypically process cues in the lower part of the picture penalize the 
contexts, NPTSD do the opposite and this already at sensorial stages of the 
information processing. Previous studies already showed top-down modulations of 
the C1 in aversive and perceptual learning (Stolarova et al., 2006), anxiety states and 
emotional processing (Rossi & Pourtois, 2012) as well as reward/motivation (Bayer et 
al., 2017), but not in PTSD. Importantly this perceptual biased was only present for 
cues of the traumatic category and not of the control neutral category. The fact that 
we could not identify a C1 while using neutral cues points towards a specific role of 
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emotionally relevant material in affecting PTSD patients at first stages of information 
processing (Braeutigam, Bailey, & Swithenby, 2001). Perceptual priming studies 
have supported the hypothesis of a perceptual advantage for trauma-related stimuli, 
increasing readiness towards possible trauma reminders and possibly biasing 
consequent behavior (Ehlers et al., 2002; Kleim et al., 2012). Our results are in line 
with this hypothesis, better clarifying an associated lack in processing of contextual 
information that might be responsible also for a previously reported lack in 
conceptualization (Lyttle et al., 2010). Indeed, this perceptual bias continues with a 
behavioral one, PTSD subjects are orienting their attention later at the contexts, and 
this deficit is predictive of the memory for the association between cues and contexts, 
while it is not for unitary representations of the same material. Again, we could not 
find this effect for neutral cues neither in our eye-tracking nor in the memory data. 
Several studies have described a threat-related attentional bias in PTSD (Bar-Haim 
et al., 2007; Cisler & Koster, 2010; Felmingham et al., 2011; Thomas, Goegan, 
Newman, Arndt, & Sears, 2013), but our results show that even though both groups 
look first at cue, the difference is in the contextual processing as previously 
suggested (Flor & Wessa, 2010; Liberzon & Abelson, 2016; Maren et al., 2013).  
In line with the neuroimaging literature on PTSD, we could show the involvement of 
limbic cortical (ACC) and subcortical (hippocampus) regions as explaining a 
proportion of the variance in our ERP window. 
Moreover, we also tested differences in subcortical amygdalar and hippocampal 
volume in a limited sub-group of our sample, and we were able to show a significant 
reduction of the latter in PTSD patients. The volume of the hippocampus was also 
significantly negatively correlated with the memory performance in the item category, 
which required mainly a unitary representation. Individuals with a smaller 
hippocampus are were able to better remember elemental information. This is in line 
with previous theoretical accounts that highlights a dissociation between amygdalar 
and hippocampal volumes in processing of cues and contexts (Cacciaglia et al., 
2015).  
The memory results show both enhanced unitary representations and impaired 
associative processing in PTSD in accordance with previously proposed theories 
(Acheson et al., 2012) as well as dual representation accounts (Brewin et al., 1996). 
Moreover, the associative memory performance was significantly predicted from the 
encoding profile. 
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It has also been proposed that a dissociation between perceptual and episodic 
memory would account for flashbacks and intrusions stating that contextualization 
processes would  alter  selective attention and recoding of the sensory input, thus 
pointing to a more organized and integrated information representation (more easily 
consciously accessible and reducing involuntary intrusions) (Brewin, 2014). Although 
episodic memory does not seem to cause PTSD symptoms (Wessa, Jatzko, & Flor, 
2006), the problems with contextual processing seem to be relevant. Altogether, our 
results are favoring these hypotheses suggesting a hippocampal processing 
impairment as responsible for the memory deficits and instigated by a strongly biased 
encoding strategy of the cues versus contexts. 
 
3.2 Limitations 
First study: In cue conditioning, during early acquisition, the association between the 
DMN and differential SCRs was observed at an uncorrected threshold, but it was part 
of our a priori hypotheses and supported from previous literature (Cheng, Richards, & 
Helmstetter, 2007; Linnman, Zeidan, Pitman, & Milad, 2012). 
The participants in this study were predominantly male. We did not find significant 
differences in the ROIs in the connectivity maps as shown from an unpaired t-test 
analysis and running the same analysis with covariates in the general linear models. 
Nevertheless, further studies should investigate possible sex effects in DMN 
connectivity and conditioning. 
 
Second study: A paradigm with shorter and multiple repetitions of the same stimuli 
would have been better suited for studying early perceptual ERP components but 
would have precluded our chance to assess effects of encoding on memory 
performance. Further studies with a purely perceptual focus on traumatic 
cues/contexts could replicate this finding more robustly. Also, we believe further 
analyses comparing traumatic cues of different emotional valences would reveal a 
trauma (or lack of) specificity bias. 
Lastly, even though several studies have profited from the usage of the MNI template 
for source locations analyses (Milne, Scope, Pascalis, Buckley, & Makeig, 2009; 
Rissling et al., 2014), we suggest the use of MRI structural data for future 
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investigations with clearly defined anatomical hypotheses. This was not possible for 
the limited structural data sample of this study. 
 
 
3.3 Outlook 
Complementing existing cognitive and neurobiological models of PTSD with the 
findings of the present study, two factors clearly emerged in explaining pathogenesis, 
pathophysiology and even prognosis of the disorder. The first factor points towards 
individual differences during the encoding of the traumatic experience, that can lead 
to biased unstructured and poorly integrated contextual representations of the event 
with “hyper-represented” traumatic details. The second factor instead refers to 
individual differences after the traumatic experience, while encoding stimuli in the 
environment and monitoring for possible new threats and trauma reminders leading 
to an accumulation of unstructured representations, in long-term perceptual memory 
(Brewin, 2014), that possibly contribute to generalization phenomena. 
 
Both, factors might rely on the well reported neurobiological alterations mostly with a 
focus in hippocampal volume reduction, insufficient prefrontal inhibition and a hyper-
responsive amygdala. 
 
The first study highlighted the possible importance of the predisposition of the brain 
networks at rest (in the DMN), different patterns could already represent a 
vulnerability factor in healthy controls for dually encoding and representing the 
information during the traumatic event.  
We could speculate that individuals showing reduced connectivity with both 
amygdala and hippocampus already at rest would be those more likely to develop 
PTSD if exposed to a traumatic event, because of their tendency to make fast fear 
and sustained anxiety associations. This speculation is supported by our findings that 
reduced connectivity of amygdala and hippocampus also separately predicted trait 
anxiety scores, with individuals high in trait anxiety generally showing both 
connectivity reduction patterns already at rest. 
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The second study highlighted the relevance of intervening in the perceptual and 
attentional processes at play after the trauma in order to flexibly restructure already 
existing memories and future memories. 
Individuals that keep not being able to attend to contextual details and to make new 
associations with potential trauma reminders, which ultimately affects general 
cognitions, thoughts and mood, could be those who develop and maintain PTSD. 
 
A recent “working event model” proposed by Richmond and Zacks (2017) posits the 
hippocampus as a key structure not only in creating and storing but also updating 
event representations, and highlights the importance to take into account event 
perception and memory as accessible processes in their interaction with action 
control. Mental representations that are multimodal in nature and built under adaptive 
pressure, can be updated through segmentation, analysis of each event with its 
contextual features (Richmond & Zacks, 2017), enabling deeper awareness. 
Such reconstruction could have the potential to break maladaptive processing and 
learning loops and finally predict and direct newly “constructed” adaptive behaviors. 
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4 SUMMARY 
This dissertation aimed at investigating the role of fear learning and encoding 
mechanisms in the development and maintenance of anxiety and trauma-related 
disorders in two studies.  
In study 1, we used functional resting state connectivity with skin conductance data of 
cued and contextual fear conditioning, well known experimental models for anxiety 
disorders in 119 healthy individuals.  
In study 2, we combined high-density electroencephalography (EEG) and eye-
tracking during free picture viewing of traumatic cues embedded in neutral contexts in 
20 patients with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and 20 trauma controls who 
did not develop PTSD (NPTSD). A memory test of the same materials followed.  
We hypothesized increased functional connectivity of the default mode network 
(DMN) with the amygdala and frontal control regions relevant for cued and the 
hippocampus relevant for contextual aversive learning and associated skin 
conductance responses (SCRs). 
The main result of this study showed that two different DMN connectivity patterns 
were linked to lower differential SCRs during fear and anxiety learning. One involved 
the amygdala and the medial prefrontal cortex (cue), and one included the 
hippocampal formation and sensorimotor areas (context). 
In the second study, we expected an early perceptual bias for trauma-related cues at 
the expense of the context in PTSD compared to NPTSD as visible in the modulation 
of polarity of the visual C1 and in eye tracking early fixation measures. In the memory 
performance, we expected the PTSD group to better retrieve pictures requiring a 
more elemental/unitary strategy (where the association between cues and contexts 
was kept constant) and consequently in being especially worse than NPTSD in 
retrieving cue-context modified associations.  
In the EEG data we found that the PTSD but not the NPTSD group processed mainly 
traumatic cues at the expense of the context. This outcome was present at the very 
first stages of information processing as indicated by polarity changes of the event-
related potential (ERP) C1. In the eye-tracker we found that, even though both 
groups oriented initially towards the cue, the PTSD looked significantly later at the 
context than the NPTSD. ERPs and times to first fixations of the eye-tracker for the 
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context, but not the cue, predicted significantly the following associative memory 
performance. 
Because of the recognized clinical implications of cue and context learning 
mechanisms in trauma and anxiety disorders our findings of study 1 highlight the 
relevance of brain connectivity differences as possible biomarkers already at rest and 
in healthy individuals. For example, in populations with high exposure to traumatic 
events these biomarkers could be examined in order to promote resilience. Study 2 
shows that a contextual impairment possibly related to lower hippocampal volume 
may underlie the encoding and memory deficits in PTSD. The memory deficits may 
relate  to the strongly biased encoding strategy of the cues versus contexts. 
In conclusion, already at rest there are different neural patterns plausibly associated 
with individual differences in learning about cues and contexts. In patients with PTSD 
the disturbed memory of cue-context relationships seems to originate already from 
disturbed encoding of the context already at very early perceptual stages. The 
hippocampus seems to be a key structure not only in creating and storing but also 
updating event representations based on accessible perceptual and attentional 
information. Interventions that aim at this encoding and memory of contextual 
association might improve PTSD treatments. 
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5 ABBREVIATIONS 
ACC Anterior cingulate cortex 
BOLD blood oxygen level dependent  
CR Conditioned response 
CS Conditioned stimulus 
dACC Dorsal anterior cingulate cortex 
DMN Default mode network 
EEG Electroencephalography 
ERP Event-related potential 
fMRI Functional magnetic resonance imaging  
Rs-fMRI Resting state functional magnetic resonance imaging 
GAD Generalized anxiety disorder 
MDE Major depression episode 
NIMH National Institute of Mental Health 
PD Panic disorder 
PTSD Posttraumatic stress disorder 
NPTSD traumatized individuals who did not develop PTSD 
PFC Prefrontal cortex 
mPFC Medial prefrontal cortex 
PCC Posterior cingulate cortex 
SCR Skin conductance responding 
SP Specific phobia 
STAI Stait Trait Anxiety Inventory 
UR Unconditioned response 
US Unconditioned stimulus 
vmPFC Ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
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